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“Though we cannot change the human 
condition, we can change the conditions 
under which humans work.” 
James Reason  
  
RESUMO 
O grande número de mortes evitáveis na área de saúde revela a necessidade de mudar o modo 
como o sistema lida com eventos adversos. Apesar de esforços para promover uma aborda-
gem sistêmica ao gerenciamento de risco, a cultura da culpa ainda predomina. O resultado é a 
resistência generalizada à investigação de incidentes e a incapacidade de promover mudanças 
sistêmicas duradouras. O problema é amplificado pelo uso de ferramentas que se limitam aos 
fatores de risco no nível do ambiente de trabalho. O objetivo primário deste estudo é desen-
volver um método prospectivo para mapear fatores de risco em múltiplos níveis hierárquicos 
do sistema de cuidado à saúde que possam contribuir com a ocorrência de eventos adversos 
no ambiente de trabalho. A maior parte das referências usadas nesta pesquisa está associada a 
fatores de risco e gerenciamento de risco no cuidado à saúde, a modelos de formação de aci-
dentes e a ferramentas de gerenciamento de risco aplicadas na área de cuidado à saúde e em 
outras áreas. Como nenhum sistema ou ferramenta única pareceu completamente compatível 
com o objetivo primário deste trabalho, um conjunto básico de conceitos de gerenciamento de 
risco foi extraído das referências, especialmente do modelo do ‘Queijo Suíço’ de Reason e da 
estrutura sociotécnica de Rasmussen. Os conceitos foram agrupados num modelo de formação 
de acidentes híbrido que abrange interações entre elementos do ambiente de trabalho e malhas 
de controle sociotécnicas. O modelo foi então usado como base para o desenvolvimento de 
um método prospectivo para o mapeamento de fatores de risco. Devido aos requisitos de es-
copo, o Mapa de Fatores de Risco resultante toma emprestados elementos estruturais do Ac-
ciMap, de Rasmussen e pode mesmo ser considerado como inspirado por ele, embora tenha 
como foco análises prospectivas, não investigações retrospectivas de incidentes críticos. Três 
estudos de caso foram feitos como teste para o método: o primeiro foi baseado num relatório 
de avaliação de risco feito com uma ferramenta diferente de gerenciamento de risco; o segun-
do se concentrou no nível regulatório do sistema brasileiro de cuidado à saúde; e o terceiro foi 
um mapa genérico de fatores de risco baseado na literatura sobre bombas de infusão. Os resul-
tados mostram que o método pode ser usado prospectivamente e que ele abrange os múltiplos 
níveis hierárquicos do sistema sociotécnico de cuidado à saúde. A natureza distinta dos estu-
dos de caso mostra que o método é flexível o bastante para ser aplicado a uma variedade de 
objetivos e escopos e, se adaptado, também a outras áreas. O Mapa de Fatores de Risco é tra-
balhoso e a qualidade das análises depende da experiência dos analistas, mas estudos adicio-
nais são necessários para avaliar sua efetividade em comparação com outras ferramentas de 
avaliação de risco, especialmente o AcciMap. Outra limitação do Mapa de Fatores de Risco é 
sua natureza predominantemente qualitativa, que reduz sua utilidade para a priorização de 
correções no sistema. Pesquisas futuras podem reduzir essa limitação pela integração dos Ma-
pas de Fatores de Risco com dados quantitativos de sistemas de notificação de incidentes. 
 
Palavras-chave: AcciMap. Formação de Acidentes. Gerenciamento de Risco. Mapa de Fato-
res de Risco. Método Prospectivo. Sistema de Cuidado à Saúde. Sistema Sociotécnico. 
  
ABSTRACT 
The high volume of preventable deaths in health care reveals the necessity of adjusting how 
the system deals with adverse events. Despite efforts to promote a systemic approach to risk 
management, the culture of blame is still prevalent. The result is a general resistance to inves-
tigating incidents and inability to promote lasting systemic changes. The problem is amplified 
by the use of tools limited to risk factors at the workspace level of the system. The primary 
objective of this study is to develop a prospective method to map risk factors at multiple hier-
archical levels of the health care system that may contribute to the occurrence of adverse 
events at the workspace level. Most references used in this research are related to risk factors 
and risk management in health care, to accident causation models, and to risk management 
tools employed in health care and elsewhere. Because no single system or tool seemed fully 
compatible with the primary objective, a set of basic risk management concepts was extracted 
from the references, especially Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model and Rasmussen’s Socio-
Technical framework. The concepts were assembled into a hybrid accident causation model 
that encompasses both workspace element interactions and socio-technical controls. The 
model was then used as the foundation for developing a prospective risk factors mapping 
method. Due to scope requirements, the resulting Risk Factors Map borrows structure ele-
ments from Rasmussen’s AcciMap and may be considered inspired by it, though it is focused 
on prospective analyses, not retrospective critical incident investigations. Three case studies 
were conducted as a test of the method: the first one was based on a risk assessment report 
made with a different risk management tool, the second was focused at the regulatory level of 
the Brazilian health care system, and the third one was a generic Risk Factors Map based on 
the literature on infusion pumps. The results show the method can be used prospectively and 
it encompasses the multiple hierarchical levels of the socio-technical health care system. The 
distinct nature of the case studies shows the method is flexible enough to be applied to a vari-
ety of objectives and scopes and, with adaptations, also to other domains. The Risk Factors 
Map requires much time to be completed and the quality of analyses depends on the expertise 
of the analysts, but additional studies are required to assess its effectiveness in comparison 
with other risk assessment tools, especially the AcciMap. Another limitation of the Risk Fac-
tors Map is its predominantly qualitative nature, which reduces its usefulness for prioritizing 
system corrections. Further research may reduce this limitation by integrating Risk Factors 
Maps with quantitative data from incident report systems. 
 
Keywords: Accident Causation. AcciMap. Health Care System. Prospective Method. Risk 
Factors Map. Risk Management. Socio-Technical System. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the general context of this thesis and the motivation behind 
some specific topic decisions. It also presents the primary and secondary objectives of this 
thesis. 
1.1 CONTEXT 
The first studies on “hospital-induced complications” (part of the incidents now 
called adverse events) were published by the middle of the twentieth century (Moser, 1956 
apud Schimmel, 2003). Driven by the impact of technological innovations in health care, 
those studies revealed some “acceptable diagnostic or therapeutic measures deliberately insti-
tuted” in hospitals could cause harmful effects to patients (Schimmel, 2003). Quantitative 
studies presenting mortality rates associated with health care were published later and pro-
moted the use of a human factors framework for the identification of factors related to error 
(Cooper et al., 2002; Cooper et al., 1984). 
The concern about patient safety grew year by year and gained considerable mo-
mentum with the publication of “To Err is Human”, by the Institute of Medicine (Donaldson 
et al., 2000). Extrapolating data from previous studies, the authors estimated between 44000 
and 98000 the number of annual deaths in the USA due to preventable medical errors. More 
recent research updates the estimated preventable deaths in the USA to even greater numbers: 
between 210000 and 400000 (James, 2013). Besides alerting the general public to the problem 
of preventable adverse events in hospitals, the “To Err is Human” report promoted a relevant 
increase on the interest of scholars in the topic of patient safety (Stelfox et al., 2006). A simi-
lar study - the Canadian Adverse Events Study (Baker et al., 2004) - was later developed and 
indicated, by extrapolation, an annual number of preventable deaths between 9250 and 23750 
in Canada. Recent studies on the Brazilian health care system estimate over 36000 preventa-
ble deaths annually (Couto et al., 2018). 
A 2008 review on the incidence of adverse events in health care in various countries 
(De Vries et al., 2008) revealed that almost one in ten patients admitted to a hospital may suf-
fer some kind of harm, regardless of severity, and that almost half of those incidents are con-
sidered preventable. Besides human losses, those preventable incidents promote substantial 
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financial costs due to increased length of stay, additional treatment for the harm done to pa-
tients (Weingart et al., 2000), and litigation. 
A comparison of death rates across different industries and human activities 
(Amalberti et al., 2005) shows that health care has a total death rate per exposure comparable 
to road transportation. Some health care specialties are more subject to unstable conditions, 
thus presenting higher death rates (emergency surgery rates are comparable to transport by 
ultralight aircraft) while others, more stable and more acquainted with tools from safer indus-
tries, present lower rates (anesthesiology rates are comparable to the petrochemical industry). 
This heterogeneity of incident rates across health care disciplines is observed in other studies, 
which place surgery as the activity most associated with adverse events in hospitals (Gawande 
et al., 2003; de Vries et al., 2008; Arora et al., 2010). 
These data suggest health care presents a considerably high overall risk of serious 
adverse consequences to patients, despite the safety levels attained in some disciplines (such 
as anesthesiology). Leape and coauthors (Leape et al., 1998) indicate the safety model tradi-
tionally adopted by the health care system as one of the main causes for such levels of safety 
in the domain. Relying on the requirement of flawless performance from personnel, this mod-
el is enforced by intense peer pressure and considers error as “an expression of failure” (Wilf-
Miron et al., 2003) that arises from “aberrant mental processes such as forgetfulness, inatten-
tion, poor motivation, carelessness, negligence, and recklessness” (Reason, 2000). Not sur-
prisingly, most doctors and nurses that participated in a survey (Sexton et al., 2000) denied 
stressors (fatigue, emergency, and personal problems) caused negative effects on their per-
formance and one-third of the professionals working in intensive care units also denied they 
make errors. On the other hand, more than half of those ICU professionals admitted that they 
find it difficult to discuss error. 
Some important barriers to reporting and discussing error in health care are: the 
threat it poses to personal reputation (especially in areas, such as surgery, where practice is 
not highly standardized (Amalberti et al., 2005)); the culture of litigation, which raises doubts 
about a fair treatment of disclosed errors (Mavroudis et al., 2005); and the common attitude of 
responding to accidents by blaming and punishing the person at the “sharp end” who made the 
last identifiable error in the sequence of events (Cook & Woods, 1996a; Catchpole, 2009). By 
instilling constant fear of punishment (including job loss and legal prosecution) in the health 
care personnel, this “culture of blame” prevents safety measures introduced in some institu-
tions from effectively reducing risk; resistance to reporting adverse events (Nieva & Sorra, 
18 
 
 
2003) for example, impedes the collection of reliable data for risk management (Helmreich, 
2000). 
In contraposition to the culture of blame (also called “person approach”), the “sys-
tem approach” emerged from the research on safety in other complex industrial systems, such 
as civil aviation and nuclear energy: it is based on the premises that humans are fallible and 
that systems should be designed to prevent humans from making errors (Reason, 2000; Vin-
cent et al., 2000; Helmreich, 2000; de Vries et al., 2008; van Beuzekom et al., 2010). This 
alternative approach also acknowledges that systems are imperfect, therefore “errors are to be 
expected even in the best organizations” (Reason, 2000). Another premise of the system ap-
proach is that accidents are generally caused by multiple factors originated in different levels 
of the system - some from inside the institutions; others, from outside (Reason, 1990; Ras-
mussen, 1997). The literature shows this systemic approach has not been ignored by health 
care authorities, as indicated by multiple patient safety initiatives started by associations, ac-
creditation bodies, government and health care providers in the 1990s in the USA (Leape et 
al., 1998) - all built upon some of the systemic premises. 
Researchers also took interest in the systems approach to safety, as indicated by 
the development, testing, and assessment of incident reporting mechanisms (Staender et al., 
1997; Johnson, 2003). Techniques for the investigation of adverse events and near misses 
(Shepherd, 1998; Bagian et al., 2002) or for the prospective evaluation of process vulnerabili-
ties (DeRosier et al., 2002) have also been developed specifically to health care or adapted 
from other domains. 
In order to adapt safety principles that are effective in complex industries to health 
care, studies have compared the latter with other high complexity areas, especially aviation 
(Barach & Small, 2000; Helmreich, 2000; Hughes, 2000; Sexton et al., 2000; Wilf-Miron et 
al., 2003; Tamuz & Thomas, 2006). 
Finally, other studies have assessed the influence of system factors on the perfor-
mance of health care personnel, confirming that multiple system factors are generally in-
volved in the occurrence of errors (Carthey et al., 2001; Gawande et al., 2003; Vincent et al., 
2004; Christian et al., 2006; ElBardissi et al., 2007). 
Despite all efforts, more work must be done to diffuse the system approach within 
health care and more research is needed to understand the peculiarities of accident causation 
in its domain to make risk management initiatives more effective. 
One topic that requires more attention is the control structure related to safety in 
health care. Despite a few exceptions (Waterson, 2009; Waterson & Jenkins, 2010), studies of 
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factors associated with adverse events in health care have focused only on specific factors. 
Those which extended the discussion to a larger set of factors were limited to internal levels 
within the organizations. The influence of higher external decisory levels in complex systems 
(i.e., regulation and government) brought to light by Rasmussen with the socio-technical sys-
tem framework (Rasmussen, 1997) and the dynamics of error causation in the system still 
require attention from health care researchers. 
In addition to the cultural characteristics of health care already mentioned, a pos-
sible cause for a certain delay on the development of safety knowledge in the area is the scar-
city of detailed accident reports required by external researchers, as noted by Reason (2004). 
It concurs with the analysis made by Dien and coworkers (2012), which indicates that reports 
upon major accident investigations and the work of scholars are required for improving the 
safety knowledge in industrial sectors. Because the relatively high rate of preventable deaths 
in health care is mainly due to a large number of adverse events with single victims instead of 
a low number of major accidents with multiple victims – as occurs in other industries – safety 
research in health care must take a different approach. Considering this characteristic of the 
health care domain, system safety researchers should focus on extracting systemic knowledge 
from analyses of regular adverse events and near misses. Similarly, risk management activi-
ties should focus on identifying and controlling the systemic factors related to the most com-
mon hazards. 
The results of some initiatives on incident investigation in health care organiza-
tions (Vincent et al., 2000; Bagian et al., 2002) suggest that the use of formal and systematic 
procedures for investigating incidents fosters the cooperation of health care personnel, who 
feel less threatened than with traditional unstructured approaches. A well-structured risk man-
agement program should complement retrospective methods for incident investigations with 
prospective risk analysis tools. This strategy might be perceived by personnel as less 
threatening since it does not involve actual accidents (and the blame potentially associated 
with them). To promote patient safety, accreditation organizations, such as the Joint Commis-
sion (Senders, 2004) and regulatory agencies, such as the Brazilian Health Surveillance 
Agency (Brasil, 2013) require or recommend the organizations under their authority to pro-
duce prospective risk analyses of critical processes. 
In many institutions, though, safety management is still in its infancy: they do not 
have well-developed safety cultures nor fully functioning incident reporting systems. Conse-
quently, there is no local data available to aid in the selection of topics for prospective anal-
yses. Besides looking for recommendations from accreditation organizations or regulatory 
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authorities, it might be suitable for risk management teams starting safety management pro-
grams to base their first prospective analyses on high profile accidents that occurred in other 
institutions. 
1.2 OBJECTIVES 
Given the influence of actors in different levels of the system and the relative 
scarcity of thorough incident investigation reports, the primary objective of this study is to 
develop a prospective method to map factors at different hierarchical levels of the health care 
system that may contribute to the occurrence of accidents in work areas. 
This study has also some secondary objectives: 
a. To merge some concepts that are present in different accident causation 
frameworks into a single model; 
b. To test the risk factors mapping method with multiple case studies. 
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2 CONCEPTS AND TOOLS 
This chapter presents concepts and tools that emerged during research as necessary to 
understand the dynamics of risk management in the health care domain and to model accident 
causation in a multi-hierarchical framework. 
The topics were distributed in four main sections: the first section presents some do-
main-specific characteristics and factors associated with risk in health care; the second one 
presents a summary of Reason’s accident causation model (Reason, 1990); the third section 
presents the socio-technical system framework described by Rasmussen (1997); and the last 
one describes five risk management tools used for incident investigations or risk analyses, 
including two developed specifically for health care. 
It must be noted that the term “risk”, as used in this thesis (unless specifically indicat-
ed), is related to safety science, i.e., to the occurrence of harm to people or damage to material 
resources due to adverse events; it should not be mistaken as the medical term associated with 
the incidence of disease or death among individuals with certain risk factors. 
2.1 RISK IN THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 
This section is divided into two parts: the first part presents some characteristics 
of health care that might prevent certain risk management approaches originated in other do-
mains (e.g., aviation, nuclear energy) from being fully used in the health care domain; the 
second part discusses multiple factors that influence the safety of health care procedures. 
2.1.1 Risk Analysis in Health Care  
The success of some complex industries (especially aviation) in improving the 
safety levels of their operations led scholars, risk managers, and other professionals involved 
with safety in health care to adopt safety principles and tools from those industries. 
While some of these tools, like the WHO Surgical Safety Checklist (Haynes et al., 
2009), were adapted with relative success, others – like centralized error reporting (Tamuz & 
Thomas, 2006) – are undermined by the negative influence of some systemic factors. 
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Four characteristics of health care seem to influence the effectiveness of risk man-
agement in health care institutions: heterogeneity of risk factors, lack of standards, personal-
ism, and the culture of blame. 
The first characteristic, pointed out by Amalberti and coauthors (2005), is the het-
erogeneity of risks in health care: while other high complexity domains, such as aviation and 
nuclear energy, deal with a limited set of very specific operations and equipment, health care 
is distinguished by a multitude of disciplines, and “the enormous diversity of its operations 
and equipment” (Reason, 2004). The heterogeneity of risk across medical disciplines is 
caused, among other factors: by the inherent risk level of each procedure; by the vulnerability 
of patients, whose homeostatic control systems are often affected by illness; by the risk of the 
clinical decision, which is affected, among other factors, by the degree of uncertainty of the 
diagnostic methods available to each discipline; by the risk of implementing the selected ther-
apy, which depends not only on professional expertise, but also on the overall conditions at 
the point of care; and by the frequency of emergencies, which degrade all the other factors, as 
they force health care personnel to quickly provide diagnosis (often, without access to patient 
records) and treatment to patients who are (also often) in critical condition. One manifestation 
of such heterogeneity, observed by Reason (2004), is that some safety control mechanisms are 
only available to certain health care disciplines. As an example, automated safety controls 
used by anesthetists and radiologists to protect their patients from harm are comparable to 
high technology industries while surgeons and nurses often have to rely only on their own 
skills and on procedures or protocols, which normally depend on human performance. Heter-
ogeneity in health care might cause risk analyses to become too complex for some analytical 
tools – especially those tools based on homogeneous models, such as the energy flow model 
used in chemical and energy industries. Also, the multitude of factors (both general and or-
ganization-specific) in health care procedures might be overwhelming for the specialist back-
ground of analysts, especially in the beginning of risk management programs, when a well-
balanced team of analysts might not yet be formed. 
The second characteristic is the lack of standardization in health care, which has 
been perceived as a barrier for achieving higher levels of quality and safety in the area 
(Amalberti et al., 2005; Cuschieri, 2005). Despite the potential benefits of standardization, it 
is not possible to implement on sectors of health care where stable conditions cannot be 
reached (e.g., on emergency-oriented disciplines, such as trauma surgery). One consequence 
of the lack of detailed protocols in health care, noted by Taylor-Adams and collaborators 
(1999), is the need of modification and adaptation of well-established analytical methods used 
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in aviation, energy and other complex industries (such as task analysis and failure mode and 
effect analysis) in order to be useful in the health care system. Such adaptations are necessary 
because the most relevant tools were developed during studies in industrial settings, which are 
considerably more structured than health care organizations (Rasmussen, 2000).  
The third characteristic is related to the personal nature of the health care domain. 
As observed by Reason (2004): “In most hazardous industries, a few individuals serve a large 
number of end users. But health care is provided in a one to one or, at most, a few to one fash-
ion”. One face of this characteristic is the closeness between patients and health care person-
nel: patients and their families generally know the names of the professionals treating them 
and the perceived quality of the treatment they received will be transferred to the professional 
reputation of the care provider. Another face is the dependence of safety upon the expertise of 
individuals, especially in circumstances where there are neither automated safety controls nor 
standards available, such as certain branches of surgery. In such scenarios, individuals in lead-
ing positions (e.g., surgeons) tend to gain more autonomy to reach their goals, which, accord-
ing to Amalberti and coauthors (2005), might be detrimental to the goals of other profession-
als involved in the process and therefore to the overall safety within the organization. As a 
consequence of the personal nature of health care, safety analysts might find it difficult to 
separate the influence of organizational factors from the personal ones during risk analyses of 
certain procedures. Moreover, because of the weight of personal reputation in certain special-
ties, some professionals might be less inclined to cooperate with such analyses. 
The fourth characteristic is the culture of blame already mentioned in the intro-
duction. The effects of such organizational culture are easily observable in the blame and pun-
ish reactions by supervisors and managers to adverse events in health care facilities. Although 
this attitude is not exclusive to health care, it is reinforced by other characteristics of the do-
main such as the limited understanding of accident causation by health care personnel and the 
personal character of the health care practice. Also, the concept of ‘health’ itself is not reliable 
for judging ‘error’, because it is not precise (Rasmussen, 2000). Some of the consequences 
due to the culture of blame noted by Rasmussen (2000) are: the increase of health care costs 
due to insurance premiums, the use of more clinical tests than objectively necessary, and the 
reluctance on professionals (especially surgeons) to take risky actions even if they might yield 
better treatments for their patients. Other consequences are the low adhesion to the use of risk 
management tools such as incident reporting systems (Dolansky et al., 2013) and the low 
number of risk analyses and incident investigations performed as well as the poor quality of 
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their results because professionals fear that reports might be used to punish them or their 
peers. 
2.1.2 Risk Factors in Health Care 
Research on adverse events in health care and on human factors indicates the safe-
ty of health care procedures may be influenced by various factors related to the different ele-
ments present in health care workspaces. According to Vincent and coauthors (2004), many of 
these factors have been neglected due to a perceived primacy of patient factors and profes-
sional skill. 
The increased focus on patient-related factors is understandable because they de-
termine which health care procedures are necessary, which organizations are capable of 
providing such procedures, and the starting conditions to which the professionals in those 
organizations must adapt to adequately perform the necessary procedures. The assessment of 
the patient’s health conditions might be influenced by the availability of medical information 
(Christian et al., 2006) and by communication barriers between the health care team and the 
patients or their families (Vincent et al., 2000; Wilf-Miron et al., 2003; McCabe, 2004). Pa-
tient factors such as anatomical and physiological peculiarities (Calland et al., 2002; Rogers et 
al., 2006), gender, age, body weight and overall health condition (Amalberti et al., 2005; 
Giger et al., 2006; Arora et al., 2010) might influence the risk of perioperative complications. 
Emergent patient conditions are also associated with increased organizational and team diffi-
culties and with an increased risk of surgical error (Gawande et al., 2003). 
Professional skill also receives a large share of attention because it is directly as-
sociated with the results of health care procedures, especially those, such as surgical interven-
tions, where protocols and automated defenses are not prevalent. Another reason for the focus 
on skill is that procedural mishaps “are hard to disguise” (Weingart et al., 2000). To improve 
the comprehension of the role this factor plays within health care processes, different tech-
niques were developed to quantitatively assess technical skill (Datta et al., 2001; Guerlain et 
al., 2005, Moorthy et al., 2005). One interesting finding is that surgeons are relatively accu-
rate in assessing their own technical performances using simulators, despite experience (Arora 
et al., 2011). Although experience might not exert much influence on the surgeons’ ability to 
assess their own technical skills in simulations, it does seem to be associated with surgical 
skill itself. As observed in multiple studies, the greater surgical experience is related with de-
creased rates of surgical complications and adverse events (Carthey et al., 2001; Gawande et 
al., 2003; Rogers et al., 2006). Other studies (Cooper et al., 1984; Weingart et al., 2000; Tang 
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et al., 2004) suggest that experience must be complemented by adequate training before sur-
geons can safely and effectively perform relatively new techniques in their specialties. Indi-
vidual performance might also be affected by nontechnical factors such as memory, judgment, 
and vigilance/situational awareness (Staender et al., 1997; Moorthy et al., 2005; Rogers et al., 
2006); Other factors also affecting individual performance are: the inherent complexity of 
some tasks, such as videoendoscopic surgery (Berguer, 1999) and drug dose calculations 
(Leape et al., 1998; Rothschild et al., 2005); and multiple system-induced problems, such as 
high workload (Amalberti et al., 2005; Christian et al., 2006), fatigue and sleep deprivation 
(Firth-Cozens & Cording, 2004; Owens, 2007), and cognitive overload (Helmreich, 2000). 
Despite the importance of individual factors, most health care treatments involve 
various professionals and the result of their efforts ultimately depend on their ability to coop-
erate with each other in such a way that everyone can adequately execute their designated 
tasks for the patients. The most important factor related to teamwork is probably communica-
tion, either in its direct form (generally verbal), or in the indirect one (generally written). A 
prospective study by Christian and coworkers (2006) associated information loss or degrada-
tion to delays in surgery progression, increased workload, instances of uncertainty in patient 
management for other team members, waste of material resources, and increased patient ex-
posure to injury. Communication deficiencies also play an important role in wrong-
patient/side/site procedures, as exemplified by an incident examined by Chassin & Becher 
(2002) where a patient was confused with another and underwent an unnecessary invasive 
procedure.  
The transmission of information and responsibility for a patient’s case from one 
team to another, known as handoff, seems to be a particularly vulnerable communication task 
in health care, as indicated by some studies that associate handoff problems to error (Donchin 
et al., 1995; Cohen, Hilligoss & Amaral, 2012; Dolansky et al., 2013). Although handoffs 
have been recognized as critical activities for more than 30 years (Cooper et al., 2002), prob-
lems in their execution still persist. Recent discussions on cognitive factors associated with 
handoffs (Cohen, Hilligoss & Amaral, 2012) might provide a solid foundation for the devel-
opment of effective guidelines in the future. 
Cultural barriers for feedback on error (generally between different hierarchical 
levels) also degrade team communication and they might prevent incidents from being used as 
a source for organizational learning (Tamuz, Thomas & Franchois, 2004). 
Besides communication, team performance also seems to depend on a balanced 
mix of skills among the team members (Vincent et al., 2000), including leadership 
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(Helmreich, 2000; Shapiro, Croskerry & Fischer, 2002; Cuschieri, 2006), and it might be de-
graded by organizational factors such as high staff turnover (Elbardissi et al., 2007). Among 
other effects, good teamwork has been indicated as a compensatory factor for fatigue among 
team members (Firth-Cozens & Cording, 2004) and it has been associated with reduced con-
version rates of videoendoscopic-to-open surgeries (Berguer, 1999). 
Christian and her coworkers (2006) also examined the effect of task management 
in patient safety and indicated that inadequate coordination of workload and competing auxil-
iary tasks during surgery might cause problems such as avoidable workload peaks and ab-
sence of personnel during critical phases of health care procedures (which might cause delays 
or even require the team to modify the planned technique). Inadequate task management, as 
well as other individual and organizational factors, is also related to the occurrence of disrup-
tions in health care procedures. Disruptions have been acknowledged as a problem by operat-
ing room (OR) professionals in a study by Sevdalis et al. (2008), but participants of the study 
tended to consider that coworkers were more frequently and more severely affected by disrup-
tions than themselves. 
Adherence to protocols and regulations (where they are available) is another im-
portant factor on the outcome of health care procedures (Bann & Darzi, 2004; Amalberti et 
al., 2005) because they are designed to reduce the negative influence of some individual or 
team factors on certain tasks. Nevertheless, some system factors such as heavy workload and 
other exacerbating circumstances might result in violations of (or deviations from) protocols 
and regulations (Rothschild et al., 2005). 
The factors related to devices and supplies used in health care procedures must al-
so be considered because good instruments and supplies allow professionals to perform at 
their best, but inadequate ones might limit their ability to provide proper care. Some of the 
risk factors associated with these resources are intrinsic to their structures: drugs, for example, 
have active components that might cause side effects (most of which are generally identified 
during clinical trials); medical devices might also have undesirable effects, dependent upon 
their functioning principles (e.g., the damage that electrosurgery might cause to structures 
adjacent to the operating site or the increased risk of developing certain types of cancer asso-
ciated with the use of ionizing radiation). Health care personnel are trained to be aware of 
these intrinsic factors and to minimize the risks associated with them. 
On the other hand, some factors arise from inadequate consideration to interface 
design and other manufacturing decisions, or from inadequate maintenance of the devices or 
supplies (Shepherd, 1998): medical devices may malfunction during health care procedures 
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(Cooper, Newbower & Kitz, 1984; Wiegmann et al., 2007) due to manufacturing defects or 
improper maintenance; poor ergonomics may result in clumsy handling or inadequate posture 
for operators and, thus, improve fatigue and mental stress (Cooper et al., 2002; Berguer, 1999; 
Tang et al., 2004; Cuschieri, 2005); and complex operational controls might not only induce 
lapses but also discourage operators from using safety features (like drug libraries in smart 
pumps) if the workload cost of using such features is perceived as high and their use is not 
mandatory (Rothschild et al., 2005). Poor interface design might also require operators to per-
form complex configurations on the devices during high cognitive load phases of the proce-
dures, and even require them to adapt their tasks to the limitations imposed by the interface 
(Cook & Woods, 1996a, 1996b). 
Likewise, drugs and other supplies might be ineffective (or even cause harm) if 
they have manufacturing defects or deteriorate due to poor storage conditions. Labeling prob-
lems might also induce drug-related incidents. Poor device and supply management might 
also cause problems such as incompatibility between devices and accessories (e.g., tempera-
ture probe connector not compatible with monitor (Helmreich, 2000)), and unavailability of 
required resources during procedures (Christian et al., 2006; Wiegmann et al., 2007), which 
might cause delays and other disruptions. 
Automation is another important risk factor related to devices. As discussed by 
Cook & Woods (1996a), automation of medical devices (e.g., anesthesia systems) might 
transfer to health care some cognitive challenges already identified in other areas (e.g., avia-
tion) such as tracking the behavior of automation, shifting from automated to manual control, 
and managing what is called clumsy automation (increasing the number of activities required 
during peak workload periods despite decreasing overall workload). 
Finally, there are factors related to the structures that provide the base conditions 
in the workspace: facility and environment. These factors are related to the utility systems 
required for health care institutions (e.g., water, gases, electricity, and heating, ventilation and 
air-conditioning - HVAC) and to environmental conditions in (and around) the workspace. 
Utility systems might present design, manufacturing, and maintenance problems similar to 
those of medical devices, but utility problems might have farther-reaching effects within a 
health care facility. One example of these problems is poor utility specification during facility 
design, which might result in unreliable utility systems, unable to provide adequate output 
(e.g., not enough O2 to supply the whole facility during high occupancy periods; frequent 
voltage fluctuations in unbalanced grids). Another example is the inadequate layout of electri-
cal and gas outlets in operating rooms, which may be hazardous for personnel and equipment, 
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as indicated by Berguer (1999). The physical space also influences safety, as exemplified by 
floor characteristics related to the occurrence of slips, trips, and falls (Bell, 2008). 
An extensive study on HVAC systems and thermal conditions in hospital ORs by 
Balaras, Dascalaki, & Gaglia (2007) associated problems such as bad space ergonomics, poor 
maintenance, and understaffed technical departments to inadequate indoor environmental 
conditioning. The same study assessed indoor conditions (temperature, humidity and air 
changes per hour) in 20 operating rooms from 10 hospitals and revealed that most of them 
failed to conform to the conditions mandated or recommended by international standards, 
regulations, and guidelines. It also pointed out some negative effects of inadequate HVAC 
systems, such as thermal discomfort, increased growth of bacteria in the environment, in-
creased blood coagulation during surgery, increased risk of static shocks (and, therefore, of 
surgical fires), and increased risk of airborne contamination and infection. It is important to 
note that some facility factors, such as indoor thermal regulation, are somewhat challenging to 
control: while low temperatures might reduce the ability of patients under general anesthesia 
to keep body temperature within homeostatic range (Morris & Wilkey, 1970), high tempera-
tures might increase the risk of surgical field contamination due to perspiration of the sur-
geons (Mills, Holland & Hardy, 2000). Indoor thermal balance is made even more complex 
by the different personal perception of indoor conditions from professionals in different roles 
and working conditions in the OR (Balaras, Dascalaki, & Gaglia, 2007). 
As discussed by Figueiro et al. (2006), the lighting conditions in the workspace 
also have a significant influence on professional performance, because background luminance 
levels affect visual acuity, visual performance, and color perception. Certain illuminance lev-
els have also been associated with improved subjective alertness in humans during the early 
biological night (Cajochen et al., 2000), which might be beneficial to the performance of 
nightshift workers. Figueiro’s group also point to the need for taking precautions to avoid 
glare in environments with glossy floors and other surfaces if daylight is used in health care 
environments. 
Among environmental factors, noise is possibly the most influential one in health 
care institutions. Besides causing distractions (Berguer, 1999), it has been associated with 
reductions in mental efficiency and short-term memory (Murthy et al., 1995), stress (Morrison 
et al., 2003), and to degraded robotic surgical performance (Siu et al., 2010). Noise has also 
been associated with disruptions in spoken communication between professionals (Kracht, 
Busch-Vishniac, & West, 2007) and it might also prevent health care personnel from hearing 
alarms and other important sounds, such as those associated with patients’ breathing (Berguer, 
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1999). High noise levels, especially in specialties such as orthopedic surgery, might even 
cause hearing loss - both to patients and personnel (Willet, 1991; Nott & West, 2003; Kracht, 
Busch-Vishniac, & West, 2007), and they seem to affect anesthetic depth in patients under 
lighter levels of sedation (Kim, Kil, & White, 2001). The mere reduction of noise levels is 
not, though, the only solution suggested for the problems associated with sound: Cabrera & 
Lee (2000) suggest that the control of noise should be combined with the use of music therapy 
in health care institutions, due to certain benefits it might provide to patients and profession-
als. 
2.2 REASON’S ACCIDENT CAUSATION MODEL 
Current accident causation models are built upon the premise that the necessary 
conditions for the occurrence of an accident are generally provided by the combined influence 
of multiple factors that affect different elements (such as personnel, equipment, and safety 
mechanisms) in the system. Although these models were developed for aviation and other 
complex industries, the premise is also valid for health care and it is supported by observa-
tional (Christian et al., 2006; Wiegmann et al., 2007; Arora et al., 2010), interview (ElBardissi 
et al., 2007), and retrospective (Rogers et al., 2006) studies that associated multiple factors to 
accidents or to certain conditions that induce human error. 
The concurrence of multiple factors in human error and accident causation in 
complex systems has been condensed by Reason (1990) in what has become known as the 
“Swiss Cheese Model”, represented in Fig. 1. 
According to Reason’s model, high technology systems, such as nuclear energy 
and aviation, have several barriers to protect people and resources from hazards: some are 
engineered (e.g., alarms, physical barriers, and automatic shutdowns); some rely directly on 
individual performance; and others are based on protocols and administrative controls (Rea-
son, 2000). Because there are multiple protective barriers, a breach in one of them will gener-
ally be compensated by the others, preventing the actual occurrence of an accident. Under 
certain circumstances, though, the system might depart from its normal stable state and allow 
holes in all barriers to align (as holes in slices of Swiss cheese), creating a trajectory of oppor-
tunity for an accident to occur. The three most important concepts for understanding Reason’s 
accident causation model are unsafe acts, latent conditions, and defense-in-depth.  
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Fig. 1: The dynamics of accident causation (Source: Reason, 1990) 
Unsafe acts are errors or violations committed in the presence of potential hazards 
(Reason, 1990) by people at the service delivery end of the system (Carthey, de Leval, and 
Reason, 2001). Although both errors and violations might be present in the same sequence of 
events, their origins are distinct: while errors emerge from cognitive processes of individuals, 
violations are deliberate deviations from practices deemed necessary to maintain safety in a 
system (Reason, 1990). Nevertheless, it is important to note that unsafe acts are not necessari-
ly caused by negligence: some errors occur due to an involuntary misapplication of mental 
processes developed through training to perform very complex tasks very quickly (Catchpole, 
2009); and many violations, despite of deriving from the natural human tendency to take the 
path of least effort, especially if the safer but costlier path is not enforced (Reason, 1990), are 
attempts made by professionals to deal with the increasing complexity of the systems in the 
workspace (Cook & Woods, 1996a; Rothschild et al., 2005). 
Latent conditions, on the other hand, are system flaws caused by the actions of 
those whose activities are removed both in time and space from the workspace (e.g., design-
ers, decision makers, manufacturers). When these flaws combine with certain unaccounted-for 
circumstances (local triggers), they might cause the breakdown of the system defenses (Rea-
son, 1990; Carthey, de Leval, and Reason, 2001). According to Reason (2000; 2004), latent 
conditions can translate into error provoking circumstances within the workspace (e.g., time 
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pressure, inexperience, and lack of protocols (Shapiro et al., 2002)); and they might gradually 
erode the protective measures in the system (e.g., unreliable alarms and indicators, and un-
workable procedures). As observed by Dien et al. (2012), the decisions that cause these condi-
tions and the incidents associated with them do not have a clear cause-effect relation, so inci-
dent analyses should not be limited to direct chains of events. 
Finally, defense-in-depth – a concept originated in the nuclear industry – refers to 
the existence of multiple layers of protective barriers in a system. In their original context, the 
objective of the series of barriers was “to prevent, mitigate, or contain unwanted releases of 
energy” (Saleh et al., 2010). These defenses comprise both personnel (e.g., via safety proto-
cols) and engineered mechanisms (e.g., automatic safety devices, levels of containment). Alt-
hough they are more common in relatively stable and predictable domains, such as nuclear 
power generation, chemical process plants, and commercial aviation, multiple barriers are 
also present in health care, especially in areas where more advanced devices are employed, 
such as anesthesiology and radiology (Reason, 2004). One problem of the defense-in-depth 
approach, observed by Rasmussen (1997), is that protective systems with redundancies are 
likely to degenerate because the erosion of one or more defenses might not have an immedi-
ate, visible effect. Therefore, the actual level of protection in the system might be lower than 
it is perceived by managers and operators. An example of defense degradation in health care 
is given by Rothschild et al. (2005), who conducted a trial of smart infusion pumps. Their 
study revealed that nurses might bypass drug libraries if the pump settings allow them to 
(which can be partially explained by workload pressure and device complexity): by doing 
that, the apparently safer smart pumps become no different from regular infusion pumps. 
These elements of Reason’s model are important because they provide a solid ba-
sis for a systemic approach to risk management. First, because understanding the role of latent 
conditions in accidents leads to prospective management of risk, since these conditions can be 
identified and corrected before accidents occur, unlike active failures (Reason, 2000); second, 
because the model recognizes the influence of multiple factors in the occurrence of accidents 
and the presence of multiple barriers in the system to prevent them, which helps explaining 
certain phenomena such as how one set of health care factors may be associated with different 
outcomes, as observed more than 30 years ago by Cooper et al. (2002) and confirmed by more 
recent studies (Barach & Small, 2000; Christian et al., 2006). These two characteristics of the 
model lead to the conclusion that accidents and near misses might be outcomes of the same 
factors, which places near-miss reporting as a valuable source of data about system safety 
(Carthey et al., 2001), especially because the analysis of near misses offers advantages over 
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actual incident investigations, such as the frequency of occurrence and the relative harmless-
ness of near-miss outcomes (Barach & Small, 2000), which might facilitate the cooperation of 
health care personnel. 
2.3 THE SOCIO-TECHNICAL SYSTEM 
A useful framework for complementing Reason’s accident causation principles is 
Rasmussen’s description of the socio-technical system involved in the control of safety (Ras-
mussen, 1997; Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000; Svedung & Rasmussen, 2002). According to 
Rasmussen, accidents occur where hazardous processes take place, i.e., at the workspace. But 
the workspace is only the bottom level of a complex socio-technical system where safety con-
trols are modeled by laws, regulations, policies, and plans designed at higher hierarchical lev-
els, as shown in Fig. 2. 
 
Fig. 2: The Socio-Technical System (Adapted from: Svedung & Rasmussen, 2002) 
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The concept of a socio-technical system helps to describe how decisions made at 
various levels of a system might cause the latent conditions that influence the behavior and 
performance of operational personnel (Leape et al., 1998; Carthey et al., 2001; Karsh et al., 
2006) and other elements of the workspace. This framework thus represents a shift of focus 
on accident causation: from human error to mechanisms and factors that shape human behav-
ior. 
The multiple levels of the system are influenced by external factors and interact 
internally via top-down decisions (e.g., laws, regulations, policies) and bottom-up feedback 
(e.g., reports, operations reviews, incident analyses).  
The two highest levels in the socio-technical hierarchy are Government and Au-
thorities (i.e., regulators and associations) and they exist outside the organizations. The Gov-
ernment, at the top of the hierarchy, “seeks to control safety through the legal system” (Ras-
mussen, 1997).  The next level, Authorities, is composed by regulatory agents (e.g., the Na-
tional Health Surveillance Agency – ANVISA, in Brazil) and multiple associations (e.g., 
ABIMO, CFM, ABNT) that interpret the legislation and implement rules and guidelines to 
control the activities related to their specific domains. 
The three system levels at the base of the hierarchical structure are located within 
the organizations. They are called Company, Management, and Staff. At the Company level, 
regulations are interpreted and policies are implemented in accordance with organizational 
context. The next level, Management, translates company policies and specific rules into op-
erational plans adequate to local conditions and processes. Finally, the Staff carries out those 
plans, interacting with hazardous processes and equipment in the workspace. 
Rasmussen adverts that “the classic command-and-control approach of deriving 
rules of conduct top-down” is not effective to control safety in a dynamic society. According 
to the author, models based on such an approach do not allow rule makers to take into account 
the local contingencies of the work context. He points out four characteristics of the present 
dynamic societies that set them apart from those of the past. 
The first characteristic is the difference of pace between multiple levels: the pace 
at which technology changes at the workspace level is much faster than the pace of change in 
management levels and the pace of organizational changes is also faster than the response 
times of regulators and legislators. 
The second characteristic is the scale of industrial installations, which is “steadily 
increasing with a corresponding potential for large-scale accidents” (Rasmussen, 1997). In 
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such circumstances, operations are only accepted by society if very low probabilities of acci-
dents can be demonstrated, and it demands more detailed models of the system. 
The third characteristic is the rapid development of information and communica-
tion technology, which “leads to a high degree of integration and coupling of systems” and 
might allow the effects of a single decision to propagate rapidly and widely through the socio-
technical system (Rasmussen, 1997). Leveson (2004) also discusses the theme and observes 
the increased coupling associated with an increased complexity makes it “difficult for the de-
signers to consider all the potential system states or for operators to handle all normal and 
abnormal situations and disturbances safely and effectively”. 
The last characteristic indicated by Rasmussen is the very aggressive and competi-
tive environment where companies operate, which leads decision makers to focus more on 
production than on safety criteria. Such pressure for improving productivity is also present in 
health care and has been indicated as one of the cultural elements that threaten the safety of 
patients (Nieva and Sorra, 2003), especially because this pressure is not generally accompa-
nied by an adequate improvement in the available resources (Cuschieri, 2006). 
These characteristics listed by Rasmussen can be complemented by another four 
indicated by Leveson, who also discussed the limitations of traditional approaches to accident 
causation (Leveson, 2004). 
The first one is the changing nature of accidents, caused by the introduction of 
digital technology systems and software: many of the approaches developed to deal with elec-
tromechanical components (e.g., redundancy) are not so effective at improving safety in digi-
tal systems. 
The second characteristic is the introduction of new types of hazards: the increas-
ing dependence on information systems ties the potential of physical, scientific and financial 
losses to the integrity of information, while common accident models are based on physical 
concepts, such as controlling the flow of energy in the system by the employment of protec-
tive barriers. 
The third one is the increasing complexity of relationships between humans and 
automation, which defies the ability of interface designers to create systems whose states are 
simple to assess and which are simple to control. 
The last characteristic listed by Leveson is related to the changes in regulatory and 
public views of safety: individuals demand the government to take more responsibility for 
controlling behavior through laws and other forms of regulation because they are no longer 
able to control the risks around them. 
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Although these characteristics were derived mainly from the study of industrial 
settings, they may also be observed, to some extent, in hospitals and other health care institu-
tions. An example for that is the high number of deaths (estimated at 90) at the Maidstone and 
Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust, due to an infection outbreak during the period between April 
2004 and September 2006 (Waterson, 2009): it was probably influenced by the scale of the 
healthcare installations involved in the incident. 
The introduction of laparoscopic cholecystectomy to general surgery is a good ex-
ample of how technological changes might influence a complex socio-technical system: the 
promising technique was quickly adopted by many surgeons who assumed (erroneously) that 
their skills at open surgery would easily transfer to the laparoscopic environment. Safety con-
cerns were soon raised and, after some time, societies and regulatory bodies stipulated certain 
requirements for performing the technique, which promoted drastic changes to the teaching 
strategies used until then (Aggarwal, Moorthy & Darzi, 2004). Analogous problems seem to 
be common in the evolution of health care installations, which, according to Rasmussen 
(2000), “appear to evolve by a bottom-up aggregation of the latest equipment offered sepa-
rately by the suppliers, not from a top-down work analysis of the activities “. 
The effects of the public pressure for safety can also be observed in health care 
and result, among other effects, in a multitude of safety decisions being taken without clear 
proof of their benefits and without sufficient consideration of their effects on other levels of 
the system (Amalberti et al., 2005). Examples of these effects include quality improvement 
innovations seemingly based on no evidence (Goodman, 2000) and protocols for certain OR 
activities that might actually negatively interfere with other primary activities (Christian et al., 
2006). 
A good example of proper safety control in a large health care system is the intro-
duction of a Root Cause Analysis system in the Veteran’s Affairs facilities, described by Ba-
gian et al. (2002), which considered the relations between multiple levels in the initial design. 
Rasmussen’s socio-technical system framework was used in the analysis of inci-
dents, such as the Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells infection outbreaks (Waterson, 2009). It is 
also the basis for the AcciMap tool, developed by Rasmussen and Svedung (2000) (described 
in section 2.4.4) and it influenced Leveson’s (2004) STAMP model (described in section 
2.4.5). 
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2.4 RISK MANAGEMENT TOOLS 
Discussing safety in industrial settings, Saleh et al. (2010) indicate that the interest in 
system safety generally increases as a response to high visibility accidents and they suggest 
that the focus on such a small fraction of the organizational accidents may have prevented the 
progress of research in system safety. 
Similarly, high visibility accidents in health care are relatively rare when compared to 
the actual number of accidents and, had the To Err is Human (Donaldson et al., 2000) report 
not been published, many of the current patient safety initiatives would, probably, still be in 
earlier stages. 
This section briefly presents some tools used for risk management in different do-
mains, part of them specifically in health care. The selected tools represent complementary 
approaches with different purposes in the risk management process and different levels of 
detail in their analyses. 
2.4.1 Root Cause Analysis 
The American Department of Energy defines Root Cause Analysis (RCA) as “any 
technique that identifies the underlying deficiencies in a safety management system that, if 
corrected, would prevent the same and similar accidents from occurring” (DOE, 2012). This 
definition indicates that RCA is not a uniform tool and also points to the main goal of RCA 
systems: to understand why an accident occurred. 
The heterogeneity of RCA approaches can be observed in the differences both in 
form and comprehensiveness of its applications: it has been presented as one step in a larger 
accident analysis process recommended to energy facilities in the USA (DOE, 2012); it has 
been used as the core technique of an integrated accident analysis program implemented in a 
nationwide health care service (Bagian et al., 2002); and it has also been used to run single 
case studies of health care incidents (Williams, 2001; Dolansky et al., 2013). Examples of 
features found across different RCA systems include: prioritization rules for selecting the ad-
verse events that should be analyzed; use of multidisciplinary teams; graphical representations 
of the incident sequences; cognitive aids that consider human factors engineering principles in 
the analysis of causal factors; classification charts (labels) for identifying dominant factors 
among different events; selection of the most significant causal factors by voting; and guide-
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lines for the selection of the proper corrective action for each root cause (Williams, 2001; 
Bagian et al., 2002; DOE, 2012). 
The implementation of the RCA system in the US Department of Veterans Affairs 
(VA) showed that the tool can help shift the focus of investigations from blaming individuals 
to identifying systemic factors associated with the adverse event (Bagian, 2002). VA’s expe-
rience with RCA also shows that it is possible to formulate corrective actions for a nationwide 
system if data from multiple facilities are integrated. Wu and coauthors (2008) note that there 
are several requirements for high-level interventions to occur and, since such requirements are 
generally not met, recommendations drawn from root cause analyses tend to be restricted to 
the facility where they were made, which is neither effective nor efficient. 
Even ignoring facility-specific problems, RCA presents additional limitations. 
First, it is retrospective by nature, which means it generally depends on the occurrence of ad-
verse events to be used (Senders, 2004). Although the use of near misses (Bagian et al., 2002) 
may circumvent this limitation, it requires the existence of a solid near miss reporting system 
in the institution. Second, the application of the tool requires a certain amount of judgment 
(Sklet, 2004). Third, like other risk management tools, it relies on pragmatic, subjective stop-
rules that depend on the aim of the analysis (Rasmussen, 1990), on the ability of the analyst to 
propose corrective measures to the causes identified (Dien et al., 2012), and on other factors, 
such as the lack of backwards information on the event (Svenson, 2001). Fourth, it may be 
very time-consuming (Wu et al., 2008). Finally, RCAs will not provide good results in organ-
izations where the safety culture is not well developed (Nieva & Sorra, 2003). 
2.4.2 Shepherd’s System 
Another incident investigation tool is the Shepherd’s System™ for Medical De-
vice Incident Investigation and Reporting (Shepherd, 1998), which is focused on the analysis 
of “device-related incidents”. 
Shepherd’s System™ was developed to aid clinical engineers and biomedical 
equipment technicians/technologists (BMETs) in the investigation of incidents involving bi-
omedical devices. The method describes a generic device-related system as a set of five com-
ponents: Device, Facility, Patient, Operator, and Environment. It associates some subcompo-
nents to each component, as shown in Fig. 3. The components, then, are the basic elements 
that constitute a system where a device is used in the care of a patient; and the subcomponents 
are “administrative causes” which “are useful in making reporting decisions and in corrective 
actions”. 
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Fig. 3: Components and subcomponents involved in a device-related incident (Source: Shepherd, 1998) 
Incident analyses with this tool are conducted by first identifying the components 
involved in an incident and then the subcomponents associated with each of them. After that, 
the most relevant subcomponents are selected and corrective recommendations are made.  
Perhaps due to the focus of the tool on device-related incidents, the subcompo-
nents seem to represent modes of interaction between the Device component and the other 
components that may cause a failure of the former (e.g.: Operator – Misuse, Patient – Educat-
ed), or factors that may render the Device component more likely to fail or to cause damage to 
the patient (e.g.: Device – Deterioration, Patient – Passive). 
One important characteristic of Shepherd’s System™ is the structured approach to the investigation of device-
related incidents: because it is supported by a simple, yet comprehensive, classification of failure causes, it pro-
vides a thorough and clear method to identify the causes of those incidents. Besides, the system’s guide provides 
some useful aids, such as a list of fundamental conditions associated with common hazards (partially reproduced 
in  
Table 1), which is useful for identifying the immediate causes of the incident; and 
a list of the groups or persons mainly responsible for the prevention of incidents related to 
each subcomponent, which might be helpful in the allocation of resources from the organiza-
tion’s safety program. 
 
Table 1: Injury Types, Mechanisms, Fundamentals and Examples (excerpt from Shepherd, 1998) 
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Injury Mechanism Examples Fundamental 
Conditions 
Ventricular 
Fibrillation 
Electricity 60 Hz through heart 2 Conductive sources, contact 
with the body, & electricity 
Burn, Electrical Electricity Electrosurgical Electrical intensity, area, time 
Burn, Convective Heated gases Incubators Temperature, time 
Burn-Like Contact Dermatitis 
(allergenic reaction) 
Reaction to adhesive 
tape 
Patient Dependent 
Injury/Death Functional loss Respirator Loss of Critical Function 
On the other hand, the system also has some limitations: first, because it is fo-
cused on device-related incidents (which defines both components/subcomponents and table 
of fundamental conditions), it might not be of much use in the investigation of incidents 
where medical devices play only a minor role; second, the indication of groups or persons 
administratively responsible for preventing incidents might be misused as a method to identi-
fy the person to blame for the incident under investigation; and, finally, the analyses provided 
by the tool are not expected to cause repercussions in the higher levels of the socio-technical 
system, because they are primarily aimed at the workspace (except, possibly, in organizations 
particularly driven by risk and safety management considerations). 
2.4.3 Health Care Failure Mode and Effect Analysis™  
Based mainly upon Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), a technique that 
has been used for decades in industry, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) National 
Center for Patient Safety (NCPS) developed the Health Care Failure Mode and Effect Analy-
sis™ (HFMEA™) (DeRosier et al., 2002). 
HFMEA™ is a structured system designed for the prospective analysis of health 
care processes. Analyses conducted with this system must follow five basic steps: first, the 
HFMEA™ topic is defined, based on the level of risk or vulnerability of the area, which must 
be deemed high enough to merit the investment of time and resources; second, a multidisci-
plinary team is assembled in order to assure that various points of view are considered; third, 
a process flow diagram is developed to help in the selection of sub-processes to be analyzed; 
fourth, the potential failure modes associated with the sub-processes are identified and each of 
them goes through a multistep hazard analysis; and fifth, the team defines actions to reduce 
the risk associated with the causes of the failure modes and outcome measures for their com-
pletion and then assigns the persons responsible for implementing each corrective action 
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(Derosier et al., 2002). Despite the use of some specific tools, the general structure of 
HFMEA™ is similar to the risk management process adopted in industrial settings (Main, 
2004) and to the process recommended for medical devices manufacturers (e.g., in ISO 
14971). 
The prospective nature of HFMEA™ is beneficial to its execution because it dis-
sociates the identification and correction of system problems from the occurrence of adverse 
events – and thus avoids blame reactions. Besides, it might be used to fulfill certain accredita-
tion requirements, such as the periodical prospective assessment of high-risk processes de-
manded from the Joint Commission (DeRosier et al., 2002; Senders, 2004). 
Because HFMEA™ is based upon the identification of the failure modes of sys-
tems’ components, it might not provide good analyses of human components, as human fail-
ure modes may manifest in various ways depending on the circumstances (Reason, 1990; 
Senders, 2004). The effectiveness of this tool also depends on the strength of the safety cul-
ture in the organization (Nieva & Sorra, 2003), especially in the decisory levels, responsible 
for balancing the cost and effectiveness of the corrective actions (Main, 2004). Like other risk 
management tools, HFMEA™ is very time-consuming. 
The tool has been applied in multiple areas, including medication safety (Esmail 
et al., 2005), sterilization of surgical instruments (Linkin et al., 2005), clinical engineering 
(Florence & Calil, 2006), radiotherapy (Vlayen, 2011), and central line-associated blood-
stream infections (Chandonnet, 2013). 
2.4.4 AcciMap 
The AcciMap technique was developed by Rasmussen and Svedung (2000; 2002) 
and, as indicated in section 2.3, it is based on Rasmussen’s research on organizational acci-
dents in complex socio-technical systems (Rasmussen, 1997). 
Following Rasmussen’s model for complex socio-technical systems (Rasmussen, 
1997), the AcciMap diagram distributes processes, conditions, actions, and decisions in mul-
tiple levels associated with a hierarchical representation of system control mechanisms, as 
observed in Fig. 4. 
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Fig. 4: Basic AcciMap structure (Source: Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000) 
The construction of an AcciMap starts with the selection of a critical event related 
to an accident, which is placed in the second level from the bottom of the diagram (level 5); 
then, the main preceding events in the accident sequence are depicted in the same level; after 
that, the equipment and environmental conditions associated with the events are placed at the 
bottom level (level 6); and finally the decisions and actions made in higher decisory levels 
that influenced the occurrence of the accident are placed in their proper levels (levels 1 to 4), 
above the level where the critical incident is placed. 
Although the AcciMap requires a short description of the events leading to a criti-
cal incident, the purpose of the technique is not to identify the persons involved or to simply 
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describe the direct causal flow of events, but to identify the factors in multiple levels of the 
socio-technical system that shaped the conditions for the occurrence of the accident. 
The AcciMap was originally presented (Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000; Svedung & 
Rasmussen, 2002) in combination with two other tools: the ActorMap, which identifies the 
actors contributing to the accidents at each level; and the InfoMap, which depicts the flow of 
information amongst the actors in the ActorMap. The data gathered in multiple single-event 
analyses in a specific domain would then be condensed in a model representing the safety 
control structure of that domain, the generic AcciMap. 
The tool has been adapted and applied in various analyses since its origins (Wat-
erson et al., 2017). The various domains where it was applied include space launch (Johnson 
& de Almeida, 2008), police operations (Jenkins et al., 2010), led outdoor activities (Salmon 
et al., 2012; Goode et al., 2017), offshore drilling (Tabibzadeh & Meshkati, 2015), transport 
and storage industry (Goode et al., 2014, Lee et al., 2016; Gonçalves Filho et al., 2019), and 
disaster response (Salmon et al., 2014), but most studies were associated with single adverse 
events. 
The main advantage of the AcciMap in comparison to other tools is its broader 
scope of analysis: while other tools used in incident investigation and other risk management 
activities only focus on workspace processes or go, at most, up to the company level, Acci-
Map also includes other potentially involved organizations (third-party manufacturers, service 
companies, etc.), and regulatory and governmental agents in the analysis of factors related to 
an incident (Sklet, 2004; Branford, Naikar and Hopkins, 2009). Other advantages include the 
large amount of information that can be compiled in a single AcciMap diagram and the assis-
tance it gives to the development of safety recommendations (Branford, Naikar and Hopkins, 
2009). 
A major limitation of the tool is its inaccessibility to new users (Sklet, 2004; 
Branford, Naikar and Hopkins, 2009), which is due, in part, to the lack of guidelines for its 
execution in the original publications (Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000; Svedung & Rasmussen, 
2002). Because of that, multiple studies present different approaches to the tool. Based on 
those multiple iterations of the technique, Branford and coauthors (2009) proposed a standard 
AcciMap format and provided guidelines for its completion, but it is aimed at incident inves-
tigations, not prospective analyses, although the importance of adapting the tool for prospec-
tive analyses has been noted (Grant et al., 2018). Another problem, when compared with other 
methods, is the absence of domain-specific taxonomies of failure modes (Salmon et al., 2012), 
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which might limit the reliability of the tool and make it difficult for analysts to aggregate mul-
tiple analyses.  
2.4.5 Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes 
Similarly to AcciMap, Leveson’s (2004) Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and 
Processes (STAMP) model is built upon Rasmussen’s socio-technical framework. Although 
STAMP also shifts the focus of analysis from the event chains to the performance-shaping 
mechanisms present in the system, it takes a control theory approach to the analysis of inci-
dents. 
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Fig. 5: Generic socio-technical system control structure (Source: Leveson, 2004) 
The most basic concept in this model is not an event, but a constraint. Accidents, 
thus, are viewed as the result of inadequate enforcement of constraints in the system. As ob-
served in Fig. 5, the general socio-technical control model in STAMP is similar to Rasmus-
sen’s, but it is formed by two parallel control structures, one for system development and oth-
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er for system operations. These structures interact at the workspace level: manufacturers (de-
velopment) provide instructions about safe operating procedures (and the environmental con-
ditions for which those procedures were developed) and operators provide feedback about the 
performance of the system during operations. 
The general factors leading to an accident are identified with the aid of a taxono-
my of control flaws, distributed in three classes: Inadequate Enforcement of Constraints 
(Control Actions), Inadequate Execution of Control Action, and Inadequate or Missing Feed-
back. 
STAMP has been used in the analysis of incidents in multiple domains, such as 
water contamination (Leveson et al., 2003), space launch (Johnson & de Almeida, 2008), led 
outdoor activities (Salmon et al., 2012), and maritime transportation (Gonçalves Filho et al., 
2019). 
Salmon and coauthors (2012) note that the tool is potentially as comprehensive as 
AcciMap since both systems share Rasmussen’s socio-technical framework in their bases, but, 
due to the need to construct detailed control structure diagrams representing the control loops 
present in the domains under analysis, it requires more data. They also note that the method is 
more suitable for the analysis of technical control failures, as opposed to complex human de-
cision making and organizational failures. 
Due to its taxonomy being based on control flaws, STAMP analyses seem to be 
less subjective than AcciMaps, but the control theory elements present in the model might 
make it less accessible to new users without a background in control theory. 
2.4.6 Task Analysis 
Task analysis can be defined as “any process that identifies and examines the 
tasks that must be performed by users when they interact with systems” (Kirwan & Ains-
worth, 1992). 
 The term covers a wide range of techniques used to describe and evaluate the 
human factors associated with human-human and human-machine interactions in a system. 
The comprehensive task analysis guide edited by Kirwan and Ainsworth (1992) presents 
many of those techniques, distributed in five classes, according to their purposes: data collec-
tion, task description, task simulation, task behavior assessment, and task requirement evalua-
tion. 
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Data collection techniques are used to collect data on human-system interactions 
and are generally used to generate input for other techniques. Examples: observational tech-
niques, questionnaires, and structured interviews. 
Task description techniques are used to present the data collected in a structured 
format. Examples include decomposition methods, hierarchical task analysis, and multiple 
charting techniques such as flow diagrams and process charts. 
Task simulation methods are used to create a dynamic model of the events ex-
pected to happen during the execution of a task. Examples: computer modeling and simula-
tion, simulators/mock-ups, walk-throughs and talk-throughs, and tabletop analysis. 
Task behavior assessment methods are concerned with system performance evalu-
ation, usually from a safety perspective. They are primarily aimed at identifying what events 
may lead to system failure. Examples include barrier and work safety analysis, event trees, 
failure modes and effects analysis, and fault trees. 
Task requirement evaluation methods are used to assess the adequacy of the 
available facilities to support the execution of the intended tasks. Examples: ergonomics 
checklists and interface surveys. 
Although most task analysis techniques were developed for industrial settings, 
many of them have already been adapted to health care (Cassano-Piché et al., 2015) and they 
may greatly improve risk management activities in the domain, especially during data collec-
tion and task description stages of risk analyses. 
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3 THE ACCIDENT CAUSATION MODEL 
This chapter describes an accident causation model that integrates concepts pre-
sent in multiple different models and tools from the literature on system safety and accident 
causation into a single system directed to the health care domain. 
The reason for describing this accident causation model is that none of the exist-
ing systems or tools seemed suitable for the primary objective of this study, i.e.,  to develop a 
prospective method to map factors at different hierarchical levels of the health care system 
that may contribute to the occurrence of accidents in work areas. 
Although Rasmussen’s socio-technical system model provides a good framework 
for understanding accident causation in multiple hierarchical levels, its causal sequence ap-
proach is more adequate for retrospective analyses, where specific adverse event sequences 
can be reconstructed. Prospective analyses, even if based on potential undesirable events, 
would benefit more from the analysis of workspace conditions than from trying to predict 
complex chains of events because analysts would not need to predict multiple specific scenar-
ios. 
The selected approach for achieving the primary objective was to first develop an 
accident causation model based on a combination of complementary concepts dispersed 
among multiple sources. 
The concepts that seemed necessary for understanding the accident causation pro-
cess from the workspace level to the top of the health care socio-technical system were ex-
tracted and condensed mainly from the systems and tools presented in the previous chapter – 
which represent general themes in the risk management literature. 
Each of the first six sections of this chapter describes one element of the integrat-
ed model and briefly discusses the concepts upon which it is based. The last section describes 
the relations between the various elements from a socio-technical perspective.  
3.1 IMMEDIATE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 
The first building block in this model is the Immediate Health Care System, which 
is based upon the premise that the workspace can be modeled as a subsystem formed by spe-
cific groups of elements. 
47 
 
 
The Immediate Health Care System corresponds to the environments where the 
processes associated with health care delivery are executed. Because many of those processes 
are not directly related to actual patient care activities, but are indispensable to their execution 
(e.g., maintenance, device reprocessing, quality control), the Immediate Health Care System 
includes the multiple workspaces where staff (e.g., physicians, nurses, biomedical equipment 
technicians) interacts directly with devices, protocols, patients and other elements to perform 
their (non-managerial) activities. It is equivalent to the combination of the two lowest levels 
in Rasmussen’s (1997) socio-technical system model: “Staff” and “Hazardous Process”. 
This element of the model requires special attention because it represents the 
places where professionals interact with hazardous processes and thus where adverse events 
will occur – even though they are generally originated from chains of failures at higher levels 
of the system (van Beuzekom et al., 2010). 
Rasmussen (2000) alerts that representations of task performance in terms of ac-
tion sequences and errors are unreliable for the dynamic work context of health care. Instead, 
he suggests that work systems should be modeled in terms of the mechanisms that generate 
behavior. 
In order to move towards Rasmussen’s recommendation and avoid a personal ap-
proach to the risk analysis, it seems beneficial to shift the focus from the actions performed by 
health care personnel to the conditions of the diverse elements present in the workspace. Ana-
lytical tools such as Ishikawa’s causal diagram with its 6M+E (man, machine, material, meth-
od, management, measurement and environment), used in industry (Gwiazda, 2006), DE-
POSE (design, equipment, procedure, operators, supplies, and environment), used in health 
care (Anderson & Webster, 2001), and SHELL (software, hardware, environment, liveware, 
liveware), used in aviation (Sian et al., 1996), have shifted the focus from people to conditions 
by arranging the multiple elements of the systems under analysis in specific categories that 
encompass all the possible elements in their respective domains.  
Similarly, Shepherd’s System™ (Shepherd, 1998) represents a specific domain (a 
“device-related system”) as a combination of specific categories of elements, the components, 
but all of Shepherd’s categories are directly associated with the structure of the domain (de-
vice, facility, patient, operator, and environment). Its structural classification of the workspace 
elements seems advantageous in a socio-technical system such as health care, where many 
systems of different nature interact (e.g., equipment manufacturers, energy and water compa-
nies, the pharmaceutical industry, medical associations, etc.), because it makes the primary 
level of the model more tangible – and, thus, simpler. Because of that, a slightly modified 
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version of Shepherd’s components, with the addition of “Supply” will be the base for the Im-
mediate Health Care System. 
Before describing the components, it is necessary to clearly express what was im-
plicit in Shepherd’s method: that the components represent the physical elements and the 
whole subsystems associated with their operational activities, including (but not limited to) 
protocols, training and maintenance mechanisms, and design considerations that might be 
more or less relevant to the processes in which they are involved. Because of that, some anal-
yses might require the inclusion of elements related both to operations and to design, i.e., both 
in health care facilities and in manufacturing plants, which agrees with Leveson’s (2004) so-
cio-technical control structure, where operation control and design control interact at the 
workspace level of the system. 
There are six components in the Immediate Health Care System – five of them di-
rect adaptations from Shepherd’s System’s components: 
Device: like the original, it represents the biomedical equipment, instruments, and 
accessories used in health care procedures and also the personnel and infrastructure related to 
the maintenance of those elements (but not the devices’ operators). 
Facility: represents the health care facility’s infrastructure systems (e.g.: water, 
medical piped gases, heating, ventilation, and air conditioning, etc.) and also includes person-
nel and resources related to their maintenance that are not directly involved with health care 
procedures. Information technology systems were also included in this component, but IT-
intensive analyses might benefit from allocating these systems to an exclusive seventh com-
ponent. 
Patient: represents the patients and their accompanying persons. It might also re-
fer to patient data relevant to the procedure (e.g., the patient’s medical record). 
Team: refers to personnel directly involved in health care procedures (e.g.: scrub 
nurses, physicians, technicians). 
Supply: this component, inexistent in Shepherd’s tool but present in DEPOSE, 
represents the supplies consumed in health care processes and the infrastructure and personnel 
involved in their management, including personnel not directly involved in the health care 
procedures (e.g.: pharmacy personnel). 
Environment: refers to the environment surrounding the workspace, which might 
influence the other components (e.g.: electromagnetic interference, external noise, weather, 
etc.). Part of the environmental factors is controlled by utility systems and might, thus, be 
more related to the Facility component (e.g., facility’s temperature and humidity). 
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Fig. 6 shows the Immediate Healthcare System as a combination of the six com-
ponents described above. 
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Fig. 6: The Immediate Healthcare System 
3.2 ACCIDENT PREVENTION BARRIERS 
As indicated by Reason in his accident causation model (described in section 2.2), 
an incident may only occur after all the protective barriers present in the system have failed 
(Reason, 1990), or, as later formulated by Rasmussen (1997), after system behavior crosses 
the “boundary of functionally acceptable performance”. 
The concept of safety barriers, as explained by Saleh and coauthors (2010), “is an 
embodiment of the ‘defense’ part of defense-in-depth safety principle, in the sense that de-
fenses are realized through barriers.” Such barriers have been defined as the combination of 
engineered defenses, personal performance and safety protocols in a system (Reason, 2000). 
The concept has been integrated into tools that analyze safety in processes by evaluating the 
multiple barriers present in their different stages (Svenson, 2001; Duijm, 2009). Although 
such tools might be helpful to the analysis of some health care processes – such as drug deliv-
ery – they are based on a flow of energy model, such as the one used for nuclear installations 
(DOE, 2012) and are not adequate for the major part of the domain, where engineered defens-
es are not available and safety depends mostly on the performance of personnel (Reason, 
2004). 
An alternative to the defense-in-depth approach to barriers is presented by Carthey 
and coauthors (2001), who also considered the concept of barriers, but described them as a 
combination of structural levels and operational phases in a system influenced by latent and 
active failures. The authors also drew attention to the fact that near misses are generally asso-
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ciated with some form of recovery from error, which, like error itself, is associated with cer-
tain characteristics of the various elements in the workspace. 
Considering that a socio-technical approach shifts the focus of analysis from inad-
equate performance – i.e., error – to performance-shaping conditions (Rasmussen, 1997); that 
risk in health care processes is influenced by heterogeneous factors, as discussed in section 
2.1.2; and that the model now presented adopts a structural representation of the components 
in the Immediate Health Care System; the concept of barrier in the model should, then, be 
associated with the conditions that affect the performance of each group of elements in the 
workspace. 
Assuming such performance-shaping factors are associated with certain attributes 
of each element in the workspace, then each barrier in this model can be defined as the com-
bination of characteristics of the elements in each component that allow them to properly per-
form their functions in the workspace, as presented in Fig. 7. 
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Fig. 7: The Accident Prevention Barriers 
Some of these characteristics are associated with engineered defense mechanisms, 
which Duijm (2009) describes as “physical and/or non-physical means planned to prevent, 
control, or mitigate undesired events or accidents”, but others are associated with specific 
conditions of the elements in each component (e.g., conservation state of medical devices, 
physical and psychological conditions of personnel, compatibility between systems, etc.). 
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Defining the collective set of characteristics of multiple elements in the workspace 
as the accident prevention barriers in the system necessarily leads to the next part of the mod-
el. 
3.3 IMMEDIATE RISK FACTORS 
In an ideal workspace, every element would always perform its functions ade-
quately and accidents would never occur, but actual workspace elements are imperfect and, 
thus, might occasionally be involved in adverse events or other incidents. 
Assuming the safety breaches that provide the conditions for an adverse event are 
caused by inadequate performance of certain elements within the workspace (i.e., in the Im-
mediate Health Care System) and that such performance is due to certain characteristics of 
those elements, then such characteristics can be considered as direct factors for the occurrence 
of an incident. They are thus called Immediate Risk Factors in this accident causation model. 
Part of those factors is represented by faulty mechanisms, inadequate professional 
training, and other deviations from expected system conditions. Other part includes character-
istics that work adequately under normal conditions but might, under uncommon circum-
stances, introduce hazards in the system. The existence of multiple infusion pump models 
from multiple manufacturers in a hospital, for example, is completely normal, but it might 
become a potential source of harm to patients if incompatible intravenous lines are mistakenly 
stored in the same site of certain device models. 
Although not all Immediate Risk Factors are associated with actual management 
or design errors, they work similarly to what Reason (1990) calls latent errors (or latent con-
ditions), since they remain dormant in the system until they combine with other factors and 
provoke incidents. 
Considering the same Swiss cheese analogy used for Reason’s model (depicted in 
Fig. 1), the Immediate Risk Factors represent the holes in the cheese slices (i.e., in the Acci-
dent Prevention Barriers), as presented in Fig. 8. Similarly to the original model, the holes are 
not assumed to be static: their shape and numbers may change due to system changes as time 
passes. 
The mechanisms behind the changes in the configuration of barrier holes involve 
higher socio-technical levels and, since this is a bottom-up explanation of the model, they will 
be explained later. It suffices to note now that changes in the intrinsic characteristics of the 
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workspace elements do not generally occur suddenly, so other mechanisms are necessary for 
better explaining how the alignment of holes in the existing barriers is triggered, providing the 
trajectory for an accident. 
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Fig. 8: The Immediate Risk Factors 
3.4 TRIGGERS 
The idea that seems to better connect the concept of Immediate Risk Factors to 
accident causation is that incidents are triggered by adverse interactions among workspace 
elements. 
The concept of “interaction” is not new in the safety literature, and it has been 
used as the base for Svenson’s Accident Evolution and Barrier Function (AEB) method 
(Svenson, 2001), which “models the evolution towards an adverse event as a series of interac-
tions between human and technical systems”. Leveson (2004) also uses the concept, indicat-
ing “system accidents can be explained in terms of inadequate control over component inter-
actions” and Karsh and coauthors (2006) affirm “it is typically the interaction between inputs 
that can influence patient safety”, not single factors by themselves. Although the term “inter-
action” is not used in Shepherd’s System™, the concept is present in its “subcomponents”, as 
noted in section 2.4.2.  
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Based on those uses of the “interaction” concept, this model adopts the premise 
that certain attributes of each element involved in a process might influence the way it inter-
acts with other elements, and thus make their interactions more likely to produce one or more 
of the fundamental conditions for an adverse event. Long working hours, for example, might 
only slightly affect a nurse’s ability to operate the simplest medical devices, but might greatly 
improve the risk of misuse of complex or unfamiliar ones. 
It should be noted that the expression “fundamental conditions” is used by Shep-
herd (1998) to indicate the conditions required for an injury to occur. Since the objective of 
this model is not to explain “injury causation”, but rather “accident causation”, fundamental 
conditions indicate here the necessary conditions for a specific critical event to occur. 
Similarly to Reason’s (1990) “unsafe acts” (defined as errors or violations com-
mitted in the presence of potential hazards), interactions that produce fundamental conditions 
for an accident are not intrinsically hazardous. They only become potential triggers for an 
adverse event when the remaining fundamental conditions for certain injury/damage are al-
ready present in the system. 
Because not all events that may provide fundamental conditions for a critical inci-
dent are intrinsically adverse and because not all of them are actual interactions between mul-
tiple elements in the workspace, but rather results of single-element processes (e.g., deteriora-
tion of supplies or device parts), the term “adverse interactions” is dismissed in favor of the 
more comprehensive “triggers” in this model. 
Continuing the Swiss cheese analogy, triggers might be represented in the model 
as relative movements between barriers. The events that provide fundamental conditions for 
critical incidents would then be depicted as barrier movements towards the alignment of 
holes, as depicted in Fig. 9. 
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Fig. 9: Triggers promote a trajectory for an accident 
3.5 REMOTE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 
Based on the premise that the attributes and, to a certain extent, the behavior of 
workspace elements are shaped by external actors in decisory positions, the aggregation of 
such actors is represented in this model as the Remote Health Care System. 
Although the dual control structure proposed by Leveson (2004) is not graphically 
represented in this model, it should be noted decision makers involved with development 
(e.g., standards, design) and operational control (e.g., policies, protocols) are all part of the 
Remote Health Care System. 
Additionally, as explained in section 3.1, multiple subsystems (and their control 
structures) converge to provide health care. Therefore, when trying to explain accident causa-
tion, it might be necessary to include some actors from outside of health care, such as energy 
companies and water distribution regulators, as part of the remote health care systems associ-
ated with certain health care processes. 
Considering Rasmussen’s socio-technical system framework, the Remote Health 
Care System corresponds to the combination of the four levels above the Staff level: Man-
agement, Company, Authorities (Regulators and Associations), and Government, as described 
in section 2.3. 
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3.6 REMOTE RISK FACTORS 
The Immediate Risk Factors were defined in section 3.3 as the characteristics of 
the workspace elements that might directly influence the occurrence of an incident. In that 
section, it was also noted that those factors might change over time, though not as quickly for 
those changes to be directly associated with accidents. Considering the Remote Health Care 
System plays a central role in shaping the attributes and behavior of the workspace elements, 
it is clear that inadequate decisions or omissions (orders, protocols, standards, laws and other 
acts) made in the upper levels of the socio-technical hierarchy remotely produce the condi-
tions for reducing the general safety level in the workspaces. Those decisory mishaps are 
called Remote Risk Factors in this model. 
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Fig. 10: The Remote Health Care System shapes the holes in the system barriers 
Some of the reasons that may help explaining how decisions made at the upper 
levels may cause undesirable consequences at the workspace level are: the difference of time 
frames between the socio-technical levels (e.g.: technologies change much faster than man-
agement structures); the difficulty to predict all the relevant consequences of some decisions, 
due to the high degree of integration and coupling between systems; the focus of organiza-
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tions in short-term criteria, due to a highly competitive environment; and the application of 
management theories independent of the health care setting (Rasmussen, 1997). 
Examples of remote risk factors include requirements for operating room staffing 
(Smith et al., 2010); weak protocol enforcement (van Beuzekom et al., 2010); and product 
variability/lack of standardization (Chandonnet et al., 2013). 
3.7 DYNAMICS OF THE ACCIDENT CAUSATION MODEL 
The complete model, depicted in Fig. 10, combines all the concepts presented in 
the previous sections. It is composed of three main blocks: the barriers, in the center; the so-
cio-technical system, to the left (formed by the Remote Health Care System and the Immedi-
ate Health Care System); and the six components in the Immediate Health Care System, in the 
bottom. 
Each of the six barriers is directly connected to one workspace component and the 
dynamic behavior of the elements in the components is the main influence on the interactions 
between barriers. The holes in the barriers, representing the combinations of inadequate char-
acteristics of all the elements in each component, are connected to the Remote Health Care 
System, responsible for designing systems and protocols. 
Interactions make barriers move in parallel planes and might sometimes, make 
some of their holes align, i.e., might cause inadequate characteristics of two or more elements 
(e.g., noisy environment and inaudible alarms) to combine. These combinations do not gener-
ally cause accidents, because it requires all barriers involved in the process to have holes 
aligned. Partial alignments might, though, represent near misses. 
Under certain circumstances, holes in all barriers might align (e.g., by adding a 
critical condition to the patient and a workload-related distraction to a nurse working in a 
noisy environment with inaudible device alarms) and provide all the fundamental conditions 
for an accident. 
The model diagram itself cannot be used to describe a specific critical incident 
scenario, but the dynamics of accident causation presented in it provide guidelines to build a 
map of socio-technical risk factors and their influence on potential critical incidents. A meth-
od for building such a map is described in the next chapter. 
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4 RISK FACTORS MAP 
This chapter describes a prospective method to build the Risk Factors Map: the 
map of risk factors in the multiple levels of the socio-technical health care system associated 
with a hypothetical critical incident. 
Because one of the objectives of the method is to map factors in different hierar-
chical levels of the health care system, the framework for the Risk Factors Map was mainly 
based on Rasmussen and Svedung’s AcciMap (2000; 2002). The graphical representation of 
the map, though, approaches the Standard AcciMap format proposed by Branford and 
coworkers (2009), which simplifies the hierarchical levels represented in the map (by merging 
the “Management” and “Company” levels into “Organizational”, and “Regulators and Asso-
ciations” and “Government” into “External”) and places all the causes above the critical inci-
dent level (Fig. 11). 
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Fig. 11: Basic elements of the Risk Factors Map. Rounded edges indicate elements not further evaluated 
(adapted from Branford, Naikar & Hopkins, 2009) 
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The major departure from the AcciMap framework is the prospective nature of the 
method presented here. Although the paper from Svedung and Rasmussen (2002) claims that 
version of AcciMap to be both retrospective and prospective, it does not provide instructions 
for designing a map and although the Standard AcciMap paper, by Branford and coauthors 
(2009), provides the instructions, it was specifically designed for retrospective analyses. 
Differences in nature also bring conceptual differences: AcciMap is based upon 
the identification of specific chains of actions and decisions at the different system levels 
leading to the investigated critical incident; the Risk Factors Map is based upon the identifica-
tion of chains of risk factors (system flaws) at different system levels that may contribute to 
the emergence of the necessary fundamental conditions for a hypothetical critical incident. 
Despite the conceptual differences, the Risk Factors Map may be considered an 
AcciMap-inspired tool for prospectively mapping socio-technical risk factors that is based 
upon the accident causation model described in the previous chapter. 
The following sections describe the eight steps for mapping risk factors in the 
health care system: selection of a hypothetical critical incident and assemblage of a team; 
gathering of the initial data; identification of fundamental conditions and scope definition; 
description of processes and workspace; identification of triggers; identification of immediate 
risk factors; identification of remote risk factors; and map factors classification. Fig. 12 pre-
sents a flowchart for the method. 
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Fig. 12: Flowchart for the risk factors mapping process. Tasks are in gray and outputs are in white. 
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As indicated in the flowchart, the risk factors mapping process has various forms 
as products of its various steps. They were developed as a means to properly register the data 
collected and generated during the production of the Risk Factors Map. Although analysts are 
free to develop their own forms, they should at least take a look at those referenced through-
out this chapter and presented as appendices, because they were specifically developed for 
this method. 
4.1 SELECT THE CRITICAL INCIDENT AND ASSEMBLE TEAM 
The first step, as in the traditional AcciMap, is to select the critical incident for 
which risk factors will be mapped. 
The selection of an undesirable system state as the starting point for risk assess-
ment is not new and it has been an important characteristic of other prospective tools, such as 
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) (Apostolakis, 2004) and Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
(PRA) (Reason, 1990). 
The critical incident to be analyzed should be selected according to specific needs 
of the health care provider: it might be based, for example, on a past accident that occurred 
within the organization, on a hypothetical event based on a high profile accident that occurred 
in another institution, or on a realistic adverse consequence that could derive from the use of 
certain technology newly acquired by the organization. 
Based on considerations for selecting a topic for an HFMEA™ (DeRosier et al., 
2002), it is recommended that analysts focus their efforts on critical incidents associated with 
high-risk devices or processes (such as those featured by ECRI’s Top 10 Health Technology 
Hazards publications), or incidents that might affect the performance of critical areas of the 
organization (e.g.: pharmacy, sterilization plant), because risk analyses might require the em-
ployment of a considerable amount of resources. 
The critical incident should be stated as a simple sentence, indicating at least the 
nature of the undesirable event and some of the main elements potentially involved in it (e.g., 
type of technology, sector, type of injury or failure, etc.). Not much detail is required at this 
time, as long as the definition provides useful keywords for the next step – data gathering. 
Although the first incident definition is formulated at this time, it might be modified later, in 
response to scope definition and changes throughout the analysis. 
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A short sentence representing the critical incident must be placed at the bottom of 
the Risk Factors Map, at the Incident Conditions level, as indicated in Fig. 11. 
It is highly recommendable to have a multidisciplinary team assembled at this 
stage to provide expertise on the various topics related to the critical incident and share the 
analysis’ workload. 
It will be easier to assemble a risk analysis team and select a critical incident in 
organizations with permanent risk management commissions, since they presumably have 
continuing methods for assessing risk within the organization, but they might need to invite 
new members – from outside the commission – for specific analyses. 
Analyses in organizations without permanent commissions will most probably be 
requested by high-level managers with a specific critical incident in mind. In such cases, the 
manager would need to find a ‘champion’ to assemble and lead the analysis team. 
Regardless of the preexistence of a risk management structure in the organization, 
certain recommendations aimed at risk management practices in industrial (Main, 2004) and 
health care settings (DeRosier et al., 2002) should be considered when assembling the team: 
the analysis team leader should be able to manage a team and should also be familiar with the 
method to map risk factors; it is recommendable to have at least one expert on the main topic 
– or topics – related to the critical incident; it might also be useful to have people with no di-
rect involvement in the main topics, since they can provide unbiased input on the standards 
and practices related to the processes potentially associated with the critical incident; and per-
sonnel from the management level would also be valuable to the analysis, since they have 
better knowledge about the factors at higher levels in the system. 
The short sentence for the critical incident, a brief description, and the names and 
positions of the analysis team members should be registered in the Analysis Information Form 
(Appendix A) or an equivalent document with basic information about the analysis. 
4.2 GATHER INITIAL DATA 
The second step is to gather data related to the selected critical incident, to the 
processes potentially associated with it, and to the devices, materials, and environments in-
volved in those processes. 
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This step is placed right after the selection of the critical incident and the for-
mation of the analysis team to represent the initial research about the selected topic, but addi-
tional data might be required throughout the whole risk factors mapping process as it evolves. 
The analysts must extract keywords from the critical incident definition and use 
them as reference points for data research. 
One source of data is the technical literature about the processes or technologies 
associated with the critical incident, such as technical papers, manuals for medical devices 
and utility systems, procedure guidelines and protocols, and standards. This kind of source 
should provide the base information about the technology (e.g., principles, applications, limi-
tations, etc.). 
Other sources of data are reports and alerts related to past accidents, near misses 
or risk management techniques (e.g., RCA or HFMEA reports). These documents might come 
from within the institution, if there is already an incident reporting system in place, from non-
governmental organizations that emit safety alerts, such as ECRI or accreditation organiza-
tions, or from governmental organizations, such as regulatory agencies. 
Finally, other fundamental sources of data are the professionals involved with the 
processes or technologies under analysis or involved with risk management. Although the 
analysis team is ideally multidisciplinary, it might be necessary to consult other experts to 
gather information on certain specific subjects related to the incident keywords. 
A brief list of the main references may be registered at the Analysis Information 
Form in Appendix A, but the analysts should also document a complete reference list sepa-
rately, especially if there are many references. 
4.3 IDENTIFY FUNDAMENTAL CONDITIONS AND SET SCOPE 
After selecting a potential critical incident for analysis and gathering relevant da-
ta, the following steps are to identify what conditions are necessary for such incident to occur, 
based only on the nature of the incident, and to limit the scope of analysis. 
As described in section 2.4.2, Shepherd’s System for Medical Device Incident Investigation and Reporting 
(Shepherd, 1998) presents an approach to identifying fundamental conditions that is based on a table – excerpted 
at  
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Table 1. Although a table is not adequate for a more comprehensive method such 
as this, the idea of focusing on fundamental conditions instead of sequences of events is use-
ful for a prospective method.  
The fundamental conditions must be extracted from the critical incident descrip-
tion, based on the data gathered in the previous step. The conditions should be independent of 
each other and all of them must be necessary – either by themselves or in combination with 
others – for the occurrence of the selected critical incident. Unlike Shepherd’s table, this ap-
proach is subjective and depends only on the analysts’ judgment. 
At this point, only the concepts related to the specific type of critical incident 
should be considered, so the analysts must ignore specific conditions of the organization 
where the analysis takes place and of other organizations that might be indirectly related to 
the analysis. 
Depending on how specific the definition of the critical incident is done, certain 
conditions might be presented in different ways. Burn injuries, for example, might be caused 
by distinct mechanisms, such as fire, electricity, chemicals, radiant sources, and heated sur-
faces. 
In such cases, analysts should refine the critical incident definition before pro-
ceeding or create a separate map for each set of conditions in order to keep the map as clear as 
possible. They might, alternatively, use logical operators to indicate alternative sets of condi-
tions in the same map. 
Like the critical incident itself, the fundamental conditions must be placed at the 
Incident Conditions level (Fig. 11) and each condition will generate a distinct branch of risk 
factors in the higher levels of the Risk Factors Map. 
After identifying the fundamental conditions, the analysts should define the scope 
of analysis. Considering the present accident causation model, the scope of analysis in this 
method might be aimed at specific components (e.g.: only Device or Environment-related 
triggers) or even specific elements of a certain component (e.g.: only maintenance-related 
Device triggers and risk factors). The scope might also be restricted by other criteria, such as 
work shift, location, clinical specialty, potential victims of the critical incident, or connection 
to a specific fundamental condition. 
Organizational limitations, such as unavailability of experts in very specialized 
topics should also be taken into account when setting scope. 
Restrictions exclusively based on hierarchical levels should be avoided if analysts 
wish to use the method’s capability to address all levels of the socio-technical system. 
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Besides directing the analysis to topics of interest to the organization, adjusting 
the scope is only the first effort to keep the size of the potential critical incident analysis under 
control. As the analysis progresses, further adjustments might be necessary to include new 
data or to address unexpected developments that might affect the analysts’ ability to complete 
the analysis in a timely manner. Reductions in the scope should be discussed among the anal-
ysis team members and should not be made unless certain branches of information are not 
considered essential or the effort to map them adequately is beyond the team’s capacity – in 
which case the team must decide whether to cut the branch or reduce the depth of analysis by 
simplifying it. 
Fundamental conditions and scope description complete the initial information for 
the analysis and the Analysis Information Form (Appendix A) includes space for them. 
4.4 DESCRIBE PROCESSES AND WORKSPACE 
The objective of this step is to describe how the processes potentially associated 
with a critical incident normally occur in the organization and to identify the workspace ele-
ments associated with them. 
The concept of interactions (or triggers) presented in the previous chapter (section 
3.4) requires thorough descriptions of the processes associated with the Fundamental Condi-
tions in order to define which workspace elements are present and how they interact within 
the system. 
Some processes might be extremely complex, so analysts should focus on identi-
fying subprocesses that are likely to provide the fundamental conditions for the incidents. It is 
important to note that some conditions might be provided by multiple processes, possibly sep-
arated in time and space (e.g., certain device problems might be due to inadequate acquisition, 
maintenance, or operation), and all these processes should be considered during analysis if 
they are deemed relevant. 
The first step should be to study references about the general structure of the pro-
cesses, such as written protocols, instruction manuals, and guidelines. This should make ana-
lysts more familiar with specific procedures outside their areas of expertise. 
Because users often deviate from protocols in order to work in a more efficient 
way, sometimes to the detriment of safety, as noted by Rasmussen (1997), processes’ descrip-
tions must not be exclusively based on written protocols. For the purpose of analyzing the 
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processes as close as possible to how they are actually carried out within the institution, it 
might be beneficial to employ techniques such as direct observations, interviews, and ques-
tionnaires. 
Processes’ descriptions should be as detailed as necessary to identify the subpro-
cesses and elements potentially associated with fundamental conditions (personnel, devices, 
facilities, etc.). It is recommended to describe processes and subprocesses with a combination 
of text and diagrams because while text can be used to record even the smallest details, dia-
grams can quickly present the relations between multiple activities and elements. Task analy-
sis techniques (e.g., charting and network techniques, decomposition methods, hierarchical 
task analysis) might be helpful to develop graphical descriptions of the processes, but analysts 
should use the techniques with which they are most familiar. 
The resulting descriptions should be reviewed by process stakeholders to ensure 
fidelity to the actual processes. 
After describing the processes, analysts should register all the subprocesses and 
elements involved with them. The Process Description Form (Appendix B) is a model of how 
such data might be registered. 
A systematic way to verify the thoroughness of the table of elements associated 
with each process is to check if components from each of the six classes in the accident causa-
tion model (Device, Facility, Patient, Team, Supply, and Environment) were identified. Alt-
hough not all processes involve elements from all six components, this simple verification 
will help to identify elements from missing classes. The complete set of elements associated 
with the processes is the Immediate Health Care System, described in section 3.1. 
Depending on the volume and complexity of subprocesses and elements identified 
in this step, it may become clear that the following steps in the analysis cannot be executed in 
a timely manner with the available resources. If that is the case, it might be necessary to re-
duce the scope of analysis to a more feasible level. 
According to our accident causation model, triggers are associated with certain 
characteristics of the workspace elements. Analysts should, thus, take advantage of the pro-
cess data collection to also get descriptions of the workspace elements associated with each 
process. 
Analysts must thoroughly describe each element associated with each relevant 
sub-process. The term ‘element’ must be understood here as the collection of persons, materi-
als or other resources that play a specific role in a trigger. Consider, for example, an infusion 
pump element: its description should include characteristics of the different models which 
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may be used in the specific sub-process (e.g., age, maintenance schedule, known issues) and 
characteristics of the whole collection of pumps (e.g., number of different models and/or 
manufacturers present in the institution, training profile of operators). Reports from previous 
device usability tests conducted within the organization or elsewhere and from analyses of 
environmental conditions might be helpful for these descriptions. 
Depending on the motivation of the organization for mapping risk factors, it might 
be necessary to conduct some of those analyses before completing this step, especially if the 
focus of the study is on factors associated with environmental characteristics of the workspace 
or with specific devices. 
It must be noted that descriptions of the elements should be based on their actual 
conditions within the organization, not on ideal representations of the system or solely on tests 
performed under ideal conditions. 
Although there might be a greater focus on identifying problems or limitations of 
each type of element (e.g.: “some infusion pumps are almost 10 years old” or “less than 20 
percent of users have received training in the operation of the new pumps”), characteristics 
that might be considered positive should not be ignored (e.g.: “at least 20% of the infusion 
pumps have integrated drug libraries” or “all operating room personnel have received training 
in surgical crew resource management”), because they are the accident prevention barriers in 
the system (as described in section 3.2). In this step, analysts should try to fill descriptions 
with as many characteristics that might (positively or negatively) affect the performance of 
the elements as possible. 
The Workspace Description Form (Appendix C) is a simple example of how ele-
ments’ descriptions might be arranged. 
4.5 IDENTIFY TRIGGERS 
The objective of this step is to identify possible events within the subprocesses 
that might provide the fundamental conditions for the critical incident – called triggers in sec-
tion 3.4. 
As stated in the previous chapter, our accident causation model is based on the 
presumption that accidents occur when elements in the system fail to perform as expected. 
Since this method shifts the focus from the critical incident to its multiple fundamental condi-
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tions, the logical approach is to identify which mechanisms (triggers) might cause those con-
ditions to emerge from the processes. 
Because triggers are related to specific processes in the organization, analysts 
must consider each subprocess as a potential source for a fundamental condition. For each 
subprocess, they must first consider combinations of the workspace elements in pairs and ver-
ify if they might credibly interact in some way to produce or drive the system closer to pro-
ducing one or more of the fundamental conditions. Then, analysts must assess elements indi-
vidually to check if they might provide any condition by themselves (e.g., due to natural pro-
cesses such as deterioration). 
Both intended and unintended potential triggers should be considered during anal-
ysis because some fundamental conditions might be ordinarily produced by regular tasks. The 
presence of the remaining fundamental conditions for a critical incident, though, generally 
requires the concurrence of unintended events. As an example, we may consider that electro-
surgical procedures ordinarily provide one condition for burning patients, i.e., a flow of elec-
tric current through the body, but measures are generally taken to prevent the current density 
to reach harmful levels and to limit its duration. Harm may ensue, though, if a certain trigger, 
such as the unintended contact between the patient’s body and a conductive surface, provides 
a path for high-density electric currents. 
Table 2 provides a simple taxonomy – mainly based on Reason’s (1990) “unsafe 
acts”, but expanded with general classes of triggers – that might help analysts envision ways 
the workspace elements might produce the fundamental conditions. 
It is important to note that certain fundamental conditions might be provided by 
multiple triggers at different phases of a health care process. For example, one of the funda-
mental conditions for a pump-infused drug overdose might be a high infusion rate: aside from 
pump malfunctions, it might be produced, among other triggers, by failure to program the 
pump, incorrect dilution or incorrect labeling of the drug by a pharmacist, or incorrect con-
centration delivered by the manufacturer. 
Besides active failures of professionals and other components, passive failures, 
such as those associated with faulty protective measures (barriers), should also be included in 
the list of triggers associated with certain fundamental conditions. 
Task analysis techniques such as barrier and work safety analysis and fault trees 
might also help in the identification of triggers. 
The Triggers Form (Appendix D) provides a simple layout to register the relations 
between triggers, subprocesses, and fundamental conditions. 
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The triggers on the list and their associations must be placed at the Triggers level 
of the Risk Factors Map. It might be necessary to use logical operators (AND/OR) to ade-
quately describe the relations between potential triggers and fundamental conditions, because, 
as in PRA (Reason, 1990; Apostolakis, 2004), the method deals with multiple possibilities, 
not with linear chains of events. 
Table 2: Classes of Triggers 
Class Description Examples 
HUMAN-ONLY TRIGGERS 
Slips Unintended deviation of action from 
intention. Potentially observable. In-
cludes wrong force/movement. 
Pharmacist intends to select drug A 
from the shelf but picks up drug B. 
Lapses Unintended deviation of action from 
intention generally associated with 
failures of memory. Not observable. 
Includes monitoring failures. 
Operator forgets one step in the 
programming of a ventilator. 
Mistakes Selection of an inadequate plan for 
the desired goal. 
The physician selects inadequate 
drug for the patient’s condition. 
Violations Deliberate deviation from practices 
deemed necessary for safe care. In-
cludes misuse/abuse due to exacerbat-
ing conditions. 
Nurse bypasses the drug library 
when programming a smart pump. 
GENERAL TRIGGERS 
Regular The ordinary behavior of elements in 
a regular task. 
An electrosurgical unit provides an 
electric current flow through a 
patient’s body. 
Component Failure Device, infrastructure system, acces-
sory or supply fail to function as ex-
pected. 
A cardiac defibrillator does not 
charge. 
Incompatibility Elements expected to work in combi-
nation cannot be properly combined. 
Interference between elements. In-
cludes allergic reactions. 
Available IV lines cannot be con-
nected to an infusion pump. Tissue 
avulsion due to the adhesive on the 
tape. 
Unavailability Element expected to be used in a spe-
cific task is not available in the work-
space. Includes delays. 
Bone screws not available during 
orthopedic surgery. 
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4.6 IDENTIFY IMMEDIATE RISK FACTORS 
Based on the descriptions of the workspace elements, the next step is to identify 
which of their characteristics might affect their performance and make them more likely to set 
a trigger. Such characteristics are the Immediate Risk Factors – as described in the accident 
causation model (section 3.3). 
Triggers are generally set by the combined lingering effects of multiple immediate 
factors. These factors should be extracted from the workspace descriptions previously regis-
tered. If, for instance, the description indicates that “half of the ventilators are more than 10 
years old”, then “obsolete equipment” might be considered an immediate risk factor associat-
ed with triggers involving such ventilators. 
A possible method to select the factors involved in each trigger is to try to answer 
the question: “Could this characteristic affect the performance of this element in such a way 
that it would contribute to that trigger?” (for negative characteristics) – or, conversely, the 
question “Could the absence of this characteristic affect the performance of this element in 
such a way that it would contribute to that trigger?” (for positive characteristics). This way, 
only the pertinent characteristics included in the element’s description should be identified as 
Immediate Risk Factors. 
Because it might be difficult for analysts to decide whether some characteristics 
are pertinent or not, the prudent approach is to classify all the dubious characteristics as im-
mediate risk factors during this step, because irrelevant factors included in the map at this 
point may be dismissed later, but relevant factors ignored here will most likely remain ig-
nored. 
Given the somewhat subjective nature of selecting element characteristics from 
descriptions and translating them into risk factors, some practical considerations must be 
made about this step in the mapping method. 
First, some characteristics might seem neutral if individually assessed – “there are 
multiple infusion pump models being currently used in the institution” –, but they can com-
bine with other workspace characteristics – “operational training for infusion pumps is only 
given regularly for model A” – and increase the likelihood to set a certain trigger – “misuse of 
infusion pumps in the institution is more likely to occur due to the lack of device standardiza-
tion and to deficiencies in the device operation training program”. 
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Second, because multiple elements are generally connected to each trigger, it is 
important to focus on their characteristics more closely related to the mechanisms behind the 
triggers. Suppose, for example, a slip trigger (e.g., “picking the wrong drug on a shelf”): hu-
man error theory indicates that slips are caused by attention failures (Reason, 1990), so the 
factors related to perception and concentration (e.g., noise and lighting levels, drug label simi-
larities, pharmacist’s workload and interruptions from coworkers) will have greater influence 
on this kind of trigger. 
Third, analysts might occasionally identify important flaws in the system that are 
clearly unrelated to the critical incident currently under analysis (e.g., a certain medical device 
is subject to interference from one of the elements in the Risk Factors Map). Such factors 
should be reported to the risk management committee of the organization so they can take the 
necessary measures. 
Finally, factors related to areas outside of the health care organization (e.g., ener-
gy quality) might be identified as closely related to some triggers. As noted in the previous 
chapters, multiple socio-technical systems intersect in health care, so this kind of occurrence 
is expected. Because it is also expected that analysts might not have the expertise to evaluate 
some factors, it is recommended such factors be not further analyzed (and that the scope is 
adjusted) or that experts from outside of the analysts’ team are consulted for these particular 
factors. 
All of the Immediate Risk Factors must be placed at the Workspace level of the 
Risk Factors Map and connected to their respective triggers. The Immediate Risk Factors 
Form (Appendix E) may be used to document the relations between triggers and immediate 
risk factors in a tabulated format.  
4.7 IDENTIFY REMOTE RISK FACTORS 
After identifying the Immediate Risk Factors, the next step is to find out the acts 
or omissions in decisory levels that caused them to appear and remain at the workspace level 
of the socio-technical health care system, i.e., the Remote Risk Factors (section 3.6). 
As indicated by Dien and coauthors (2012), analysts implicitly halt analyses dur-
ing incident investigations when they reach the causes to which they cannot propose correc-
tive measures. In this method, analyses should consider the whole socio-technical system, 
because even if analysts are not in a position to recommend changes to certain hierarchical 
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levels (especially outside of the organization), the knowledge of factors in those levels might 
help to devise strategies to minimize their negative effects within the organization. 
These factors may be identified by looking for actions or decisions in higher hier-
archical levels of the system that induced or failed to prevent the emergence of undesirable 
characteristics in the elements forming the workspace. Based on the dichotomous develop-
ment/operations socio-technical system control structure proposed by Leveson (2004) (pre-
sented in Fig. 5), two simple pairs of questions may be used to identify the remote risk factors 
associated with the immediate ones: 
1. Is such Immediate Risk Factor associated with either the behavior or the opera-
tional instructions of workspace elements? If so, how are operational practices 
and protocols defined? 
2. Is such Immediate Risk Factor associated with the design or other intrinsic 
characteristics of the workspace elements? If so, how are the design and speci-
fications of the workspace elements defined? 
The control mechanisms that answer each pair of questions are the remote factors 
more directly related to the immediate risk factors in the workspace. These factors will not 
necessarily be located at the managerial level right above the workspace, since some decisions 
made at regulatory levels, for example, are instructions directly aimed at specific practices or 
devices. 
The Remote Risk Factors might be chained to other factors, generally in higher 
levels of the socio-technical control hierarchy. Since decisory mechanisms are more complex 
than workspace elements, it is not possible to apply the same design/operations classification 
to drive the identification of the remote factors chained above them. Instead, analysts should 
look for rules, laws, standards and other control mechanisms related to each specific remote 
factor. 
Chains of Remote Risk Factors climb up the socio-technical hierarchy until it 
reaches a factor in a level where competent authorities have autonomy to control it, or until it 
reaches a factor that is not subject to any authority in the hierarchy (e.g., public opinion). 
Similarly to the Immediate Risk Factors, multiple remote factors might concur-
rently influence factors in lower levels. 
The factors identified in this step and their connections must be placed at the Or-
ganizational and External levels of the Risk Factors Map. 
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The list of remote factors and their relations should also be registered in a tabular 
form such as the Remote Risk Factors Form present in Appendix F. 
4.8 CLASSIFY MAP FACTORS 
The final step in the mapping process is to classify the triggers and risk factors in-
cluded in the Risk Factors Map, i.e., to recommend some map elements for further analyses 
and remove unimportant ones. 
Even with multiple scope adjustments during analysis, the described method 
might produce cluttered maps with no indication of which factors should be marked for future 
corrections. To avoid the unnecessary expenditure of resources, analysts must try to dismiss 
irrelevant factors that might have made it to the factors map and highlight those deemed more 
relevant to the critical incident. 
Since the nature of some risk factors might be more or less objective than others 
(e.g., water quality and distractions), the analysis team might require multiple tools to assess 
the relevance of different risk factors. 
We recommend analysts not to worry about ranking risk factors at this point. In-
stead, they should only sort factors (or triggers) into three groups: confirmed, dismissed, and 
reasonable factors. 
Confirmed factors are those whose influence on the potential critical incident is 
confirmed by objective data on previous incidents or by expert opinion. Dismissed factors are 
those whose influence is dismissed by objective data or expert opinion – e.g., because there 
are effective countermeasures for them. Finally, reasonable factors are those whose influence 
cannot be traced to a specific previous incident but neither can be dismissed because they 
seem plausible enough to be kept on the map. 
Analysts should clearly define the criteria for each class, according to the selected 
tools. For quantitative methods, such as Likert scales, hazard scores, and objective measure-
ments, analysts should indicate thresholds for relevance classes. For more subjective tools, 
such as interviews with experts, analyses of previous incident reports, and observations, ana-
lysts might need to prepare a list of criteria for each class. 
After classifying the factors – and, possibly, triggers and conditions – analysts 
might want to prepare two versions of the Risk Factor Map: a documentation version and a 
highlights version. 
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The documentation version must include all the elements considered during anal-
ysis and might serve as a reference for future analyses. In this version, confirmed factors must 
be indicated by grey textboxes; dismissed factors, by strikethrough text; and reasonable ones, 
by regular text boxes. 
The highlights version of the Risk Factors Map is a simplified diagram aimed at 
managers and other stakeholders unfamiliar with the method presented here. This version pre-
sents no dismissed factors and the confirmed ones are highlighted by grey textboxes and big-
ger font. For clarity purposes, analysts might choose to also remove some reasonable factors 
from this version if they seem unlikely to receive attention from its intended public. 
The Classification Form in Appendix G can be used to register the relevance of 
risk factors and other workspace elements, as well as the justification for each classification. 
A final analysis report should include all the data gathered during analysis, but al-
so provide a simplified description of the topic and its motivations, the analysis limitations 
and methods, the main findings, and both a documentation and a highlights version of the Risk 
Factors Map. The simplified data on the final report will be aimed at stakeholders not familiar 
with the method, thus it should be placed at the beginning. 
Appendix H, Guidelines for Mapping, presents some guidelines for the mapping 
process; and Appendix I, Guidelines for Reporting, some guidelines for composing a final 
report. 
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5 RESULTS 
This chapter presents three case studies aimed at testing the method with a variety 
of objectives and scopes. 
In the first case, the critical incident is related to a key part of the medical instru-
ments sterilization process: the cleaning. The core data was obtained from the final report of a 
risk assessment made with a different risk management tool. 
In the second case, the critical incident is related to the medical devices market 
entry process and the analysis is mainly based on regulations and open reports from the regu-
latory agency. 
In the final case, a generic critical incident associated with infusion pumps was se-
lected and the analysis was based on the literature on infusion pumps. 
The diagrams were drawn with the Microsoft Visio software and the forms were 
made with the Microsoft Excel software. 
5.1 FIRST CASE: THE SURGICAL INSTRUMENT CLEANING PROCESS 
This case study is focused on a small yet fundamental health care process: the in-
strument cleaning before disinfection or sterilization. 
This topic was selected due to the necessity of testing the proposed method with 
data from a specific workspace and to the author’s familiarity with the HFMEA report (Sousa, 
2014) where such data were readily available. 
The original study was conducted by a graduate student as part of her master’s 
degree. After selecting a hospital’s sterilization plant and the cleaning process as the topic to 
apply the HFMEA method – as described by DeRosier et al., 2002 –,a multidisciplinary team 
was gathered and adopted the following steps during multiple meetings: describe the process; 
identify the failure modes and potential causes; rate severity and probability for each potential 
cause; and propose corrective actions. 
Following the proposed method here, the first step for a Risk Factors Map was to 
select a critical incident associated with the process analyzed in the report, i.e., instrument 
cleaning. Since the objective of the cleaning process – which includes rinsing and drying 
(Acosta-Gnass & Stempliuk, 2010) – is “the removal of the visible soil” (Rutala and Weber, 
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2008) the critical incident had to be associated with the instruments’ final state after the pro-
cess. 
Considering the instrument must be both clean and dry (Sousa, 2014), the critical 
incident was defined as “Dirty or moist instrument leaves cleaning area”. It indicates a situa-
tion where, despite passing through the cleaning process, the instrument is not thoroughly 
cleaned or dried, but validation fails to prevent it from proceeding to sterilization or disinfec-
tion – thus jeopardizing the effectiveness of those processes. The critical incident was placed 
at the bottom of the Incident Conditions level of the Risk Factors Map (Fig. 13). 
The second step was to gather data. The main data source for this case was the 
aforementioned HFMEA report (Sousa, 2014). The other main sources, necessary to better 
understand the cleaning procedure, were guidelines for sterilization and disinfection (Rutala 
and Weber, 2008; Acosta-Gnass & Stempliuk, 2010), and a national regulation on good medi-
cal device processing practices (Brasil, 2012). 
The third step was to identify the fundamental conditions for the critical incident. 
Three fundamental conditions were extracted from the critical incident description: “instru-
ment is dirty” (C1); “instrument is moist” (C2); and “instrument proceeds to other processing 
stages” (C3). 
Restrictions of the scope were mainly based on the processes, failure modes, po-
tential causes, and workspace characteristics identified in the original report: “only immediate 
risk factors related to the cleaning area”; “only sub-processes related to the instrument clean-
ing phase”; and “only non-automated processes”. 
Dirty instrument 
leaves cleaning area
Incident 
Conditions
Triggers
C2. 
Instrument 
is moist
C3.
Instrument proceeds 
to other stages
C1. 
Instrument 
is dirty
T3. Deficient 
brushing
T2. 
Incomplete 
brushing
T1. Materials 
incompatible 
with dirt
T4. Deficient 
rinsing
T5. Incomplete 
rinsing
T6. Contact 
with dirt 
after rinsing
T7. Deficient 
drying
T8. 
Incomplete 
drying
T9. Contact 
with moisture 
after drying
T10. Deficient 
inspection
T11. Ignored 
inspection
T12. 
Tests not 
performed
T13. Tests 
results ignored
 
Fig. 13: Connections between fundamental conditions and triggers in the first case study. 
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The fourth step was to draft a simplified processes diagram based on the refer-
ences. Four subprocesses (brushing, rinsing, drying, and validation) as well as the tasks and 
workspace elements, such as the sinks, brushes, detergents, and professionals associated with 
the brushing sub-process, were identified. The process diagram is presented in Fig. 14. 
The twelve workspace elements identified were then placed in a table and their 
descriptions were extracted from the failure modes and potential causes of the HFMEA re-
port. 
1. Brushing
a. Apply 
detergent
b. Brush
2. Rinsing
a. Select proper 
water source
b. Rinse with 
abundant 
amount of water
3. Drying
a. Dry with cloth
OR
b. Dry with 
compressed air
4. Validation
a. Visual 
inspection
b. Chemical 
controls (visible 
dirt test, 
disinfection test)
 
Fig. 14: Process diagram for surgical instrument cleaning 
The fifth step was to identify the triggers associated with the fundamental condi-
tions. The combinations between fundamental conditions and subprocesses were assessed 
with the framework of the Classes of Triggers (Table 2) and the triggers associated with each 
condition were identified and registered at the Table of Triggers Form. As an example, the 
trigger “Materials incompatible with dirt” (T1) was identified at the “Brushing” sub-process 
as a potential trigger for the “Instrument is dirty” (C1) fundamental condition. A total of thir-
teen triggers were associated with the three fundamental conditions. They were placed at the 
Triggers level of the Risk Factors Map, as presented in Fig. 13. 
The sixth step was to identify the Immediate Risk Factors. The descriptions of 
workspace elements associated with each one of the thirteen triggers were analyzed and the 
element characteristics that were considered influential to the triggers were extracted as im-
mediate risk factors (“Inadequate brushes” (I2), for example, was associated with three trig-
gers: “Materials incompatible with dirt” (T1), “Incomplete brushing” (T2), and “Deficient 
brushing” |(T3). A total of seventeen immediate risk factors were extracted from the descrip-
tions and registered in the Immediate Risk Factors Form. The seventeen factors were placed 
at the Workspace level of the Risk Factors Map and connected to their respective triggers. 
Because some factors influence multiple triggers, the connections between them totaled 44. 
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The Risk Factors Map excerpt in Fig. 15 shows the immediate factors associated only with 
the three aforementioned triggers. 
Dirty instrument 
leaves cleaning area
Incident 
Conditions
Triggers
Workspace
External
Organizational
C2. 
Instrument 
is moist
C3.
Instrument proceeds 
to other stages
C1. 
Instrument 
is dirty
O7. No 
funds
O4. Deficient 
procurement 
process
E2. Restrictive 
procurement 
law
O2. Deficient 
materials 
manag.
E4. State 
Budget
O8. Insufficient 
workforce
O5. Deficient 
training 
program
O1. Poor 
Communication 
protocols
E3. Reimbursement 
rates - SUS
T3. Deficient 
brushing
T2. Incomplete 
brushing
T1. Materials 
incompatible 
with dirt
I1. 
Detergent 
quality
I3. 
Instrument 
design
I2. 
Inadequate 
brushes
I4. Inadequate 
lighting
I6. High 
workload
I5. 
Inadequate 
training
I7. Small 
Space
O3. 
Inadequate 
facility design
O9. Low 
automation
O6. Deficient 
personnel 
requirements
E1. Legal 
operational 
requirements
 
Fig. 15: Excerpt from the Risk Factors Map – factors related to the brushing sub-process 
The seventh step was to identify the remote risk factors that might be the reason 
for the immediate risk factors just identified. Operational and design causes for each immedi-
ate factor were considered: although some were directly based on the failure modes causes 
present in the original analysis, part of the remote factors was derived from them. The “inade-
quate brushes” immediate factor, for example, was considered to be influenced by “deficient 
materials management”. Seventeen connections were directly made between the seventeen 
immediate risk factors and seven remote risk factors, but while some immediate factors had 
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no connections due to scope restrictions (indicated by rounded edges in Fig. 15), others were 
connected to multiple remote factors. 
After identifying those seven remote risk factors, the same operational and design 
considerations were applied to them and remote factors at higher levels were identified. The 
process was then repeated to the chained factors that were still not out of scope until no more 
factors could still be considered within the scope. The “deficient materials management” re-
mote factor, for example, was chained to “poor communication protocols”, “no funds”, and 
“deficient procurement process”, all at the Organizational level of the Risk Factors Map, as 
observed in Fig. 15. The last two remote factors were chained, respectively, to “state budget” 
and “reimbursement rates”, and to “restrictive procurement law”, all at the External level of 
the map. 
A total of nine remote factors were chained – directly or indirectly – to the first 
seven ones and the connections between then totaled fifteen. Most remote factors were from 
the organizational level of the socio-technical system. 
Some of the remote risk factors, such as “restrictive procurement law”, were ex-
tracted directly from the original report, but others, like “deficient procurement process” were 
included for analytical purposes because they were implicitly indicated elsewhere. The con-
nections with and among remote risk factors were registered in the Remote Risk Factors 
Form. 
The final step was to classify the map factors as dismissed, confirmed or reasona-
ble. In this case, the author took advantage of the HFMEA structure applied to the original 
analysis and used the probability ratings already present there as the classification criteria for 
the Risk Factors Map: risk factors associated with failure modes with “remote” probabilities 
were classified as dismissed; “frequent” ones, as confirmed; and the others – “occasional” and 
“rare” – as reasonable. Fig. 15 presents a complete branch of the risk factors map, with con-
firmed factors indicated by grey textboxes; dismissed factors, by strikethrough text; and rea-
sonable factors, by regular text boxes. The complete classification data were registered in the 
Classification Form. 
The complete forms and maps related to this case are included in Appendix J. 
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5.2 SECOND CASE: MEDICAL DEVICES REGULATIONS 
This case study is aimed at the regulatory level of the Brazilian health care system 
– more specifically at the medical devices premarket approval regulations. 
The topic selection was motivated by an interest in verifying if the tool would al-
low analyses to depart from hierarchical levels above the workspace. 
The first step was to select the critical incident and, considering the focus on regu-
lations, the most direct failure that could occur in the regulatory system was selected: “A haz-
ardous medical device legally reaches healthcare in Brazil”. It was placed at the bottom of the 
Incident Conditions level of the Risk Factors Map as “Unsafe medical device reaches 
healthcare” 
Since the focus was not on an ordinary workspace, but on the regulatory system, 
the second step, data gathering, was mainly focused on the body of regulations issued by the 
Brazilian Health Surveillance Agency (ANVISA), but other sources such as international 
medical device standards, official medical device incident reports, ANVISA’s operational 
reports and publications related to regulations were also used. 
All the regulations related to the premarket approval process of medical devices – 
more specifically, of medical equipment – up to 02/23/2016 were examined and notes on re-
quirements and on process particularities were taken. In this step, special attention was given 
to regulations that determined or changed the requirements for the various parts of the medi-
cal device premarket review process. 
The third step was to identify the fundamental conditions and two pairs of condi-
tions were extracted from the critical incident description. The first pair is related to the inher-
ent risk associated with specific technologies: “device has an inherently high risk” and “clini-
cal reports are not reproved”. The second pair is related to design and manufacturing – “de-
vice has faulty parts or design” and “technical report is not reproved”. Either pair of condi-
tions is enough to provoke the critical incident, so logical operators were used in the Risk Fac-
tors Map to explain their relations (Fig. 16). 
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Fig. 16: Connections between fundamental conditions and triggers in the second case study. 
Since the fundamental conditions point at multiple directions, workspace repre-
sents the aggregation of four different workspaces in this case: the clinical investigation facili-
ties where trials are made; the plants where devices are manufactured; the metrology laborato-
ries where devices are tested for technical safety requirements; and the regulators’ offices 
where clinical and technical assessment reports are evaluated by regulatory agents. 
Because the focus of this study is on regulations, specific conditions of the multi-
ple workspaces (e.g., the training of technical laboratory personnel) were mostly left out of 
the scope, except when deemed necessary to represent the systemic effects of regulatory flaws 
(e.g., the academic background of GMP inspectors). Potential criminal acts, such as bribery 
and clinical data fabrication, were also ignored in order to keep the focus on the regulations. 
The fourth step was to describe the medical device market approval process. Since 
there was no interest in workspace details, the process was just roughly drafted. Four main 
subprocesses were identified: “Manufacturing”, “Device Certification”, “Clinical Assess-
ment”, and “Report Evaluation”. Only eight workspace elements were associated with the 
subprocesses, but some of them were actually formed by multiple smaller elements that were 
too specific to remain in the scope but had analytical value as a group (“device certification 
system”, for example, included protocols, personnel, laboratories, etc.). The process descrip-
tion and simplified diagram were registered at the Process Description Form. 
The eight workspace element descriptions were succinct and they were mainly 
based on the references, but some professional judgment was necessary to fill some gaps. 
They were registered at the Workspace Description Form. 
Unsafe medical 
device reaches 
healthcare
Benefits 
outweigh risks
Clinical 
assessement 
fails to reveal 
hazard
No clinical 
evaluation 
required
Incident 
Conditions
Triggers
Clinical 
report is 
approved by 
mistake
Device has 
inherently 
high risk
Failure to reprove 
clinical report
Technical 
tests fail to 
reveal faulty 
parts/design
Technical 
tests not 
required
Manufacturer 
employs faulty 
parts/design
Parts 
deteriorate 
after assembly
Technical 
report 
approved by 
mistake
Faulty Parts/
Design
Failure to repprove 
technical tests
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The fifth step was to assess the combinations between fundamental conditions and 
subprocesses (using Table 2 – Classes of Triggers) and identify the triggers. As an example, 
the trigger “No clinical evaluation required” was identified at the “Report evaluation” process 
as a potential trigger to the fundamental condition “Failure to reprove clinical report”. Fig. 16 
shows the nine triggers identified for this case and their connections to their respective fun-
damental conditions. The triggers were registered at the Triggers Form and placed at the 
Triggers level of the Risk Factors Map. 
The sixth step was to identify the Immediate Risk Factors. Since the focus of this 
case was on regulations, details on workspace elements were mostly unimportant to this anal-
ysis and the immediate risk factors were only indications of their potential imperfections (e.g., 
“poor quality control” and “inadequate GMP inspectors”). A total of only eight immediate 
factors were associated with the nine triggers: they were registered at the Immediate Risk Fac-
tors Form and placed at the Workspace level of the Risk Factors Map.  Fig. 17 shows an ex-
cerpt of the map with the two triggers and three immediate factors associated with the “Faulty 
parts/design” fundamental condition. 
The seventh step was to identify the remote risk factors. Unlike the pattern pre-
sented in this accident causation model, i.e., triggers are connected to immediate risk factors 
and immediate risk factors are connected to remote risk factors, this case has three triggers 
(“Benefits outweigh risks”, “No clinical evaluation required”, and “Technical tests not re-
quired”) directly connected to remote risk factors at the External level of the system (respec-
tively, “Permitted by regulations”, “Inadequate clinical assessment requirements”, and “Inad-
equate technical testing requirements”). These connections are related to regulatory exemp-
tions from certain process requirements that directly affect the workspace processes associat-
ed with those specific triggers. 
A total of twenty remote risk factors was directly or indirectly connected to the 
eight immediate risk factors (and to three of the triggers) in a total of 35 connections, includ-
ing those between chained remote factors. The remote risk factors were registered at the Re-
mote Risk Factors Form and placed at the Organizational and External levels of the Risk Fac-
tors Map. The excerpt in Fig. 17 shows three remote factors at the Organizational level and 
three more at the External level. 
Most remote factors were extracted from the references and adjusted for analytical 
purposes. The need for adjustments, in this case, is observable in the triggers related to report 
evaluations – “clinical report is approved by mistake” and “technical report is approved by 
mistake”: although these are regulatory activities (thus normally related to the External level), 
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some remote risk factors were placed at the Organizational level on the map. The reason for 
that was to keep the institutional rules and protocols that shape the regulatory office activities 
close to the Workspace level on the map. 
 
Fig. 17: Excerpt from the Risk Factors Map – factors related to the “Faulty parts/design” condition. 
The last step was to classify the map factors. In this case, only two classification 
criteria were determined: evidence among the references indicating the influence of the factor 
on the system provided a confirmed classification; evidence negating the influence of the fac-
tor, e.g., through countermeasures, provided a dismissed classification. All the other factors – 
for which no positive or negative evidence could be found – were classified as reasonable. 
The primary source for this kind of evidence was the public information provided by the regu-
latory agency, especially the regulations, but guidelines and public reports were also consid-
ered. In a total of 36 risk factors (immediate or remote), two remote risk factors were classi-
fied as confirmed (indicated by grey textboxes) and two as dismissed (indicated by 
strikethrough text). The classification data were registered in the Classification Form. 
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Appendix K presents the complete forms and maps related to this case study. 
5.3 THIRD CASE: INFUSION PUMPS 
The objective of this case study was to verify if the tool can adequately be used to 
build a generic Risk Factors Map – a comprehensive representation of the risk factors associ-
ated with a generic critical incident, i.e., a critical incident not related to a specific setting – 
similar to Svedung’s and Rasmussen’s (2002) generic AcciMap. 
Infusion pumps were selected as the topic for this case study because they are 
ubiquitous in healthcare and because of their repeated appearance on ECRI’s Top 10 Health 
Technology Hazards series. 
The first step was to select a critical incident. Given the topic and the intention of 
producing a generic risk factors map, the selected critical incident had to be associated with 
the device’s fundamental function – i.e., delivering drugs to patients at a specific pattern – and 
it was formulated as “Inadequate drug dose delivered to the patient by infusion pump”. 
The second step was to gather data. References for this case study included a bio-
medical engineering handbook, an international technical standard on infusion pumps, guide-
lines for medication administration and patient safety, a report from an infusion device sum-
mit, an infusion pump life cycle guidance aimed at industry and regulators, and online instruc-
tional resources on setting up infusion pumps. 
The third step was to identify the fundamental conditions. After analyzing the ref-
erences, three conditions were derived from the critical incident description: “Reduced 
dose/No delivery”, “Increased dose”, and “Rate variation”. The conditions were registered in 
the Analysis Information Form and connected to the critical incident at the Incident Condi-
tions level of the Risk Factors Map (Fig. 18). 
Because it is a generic map, certain restrictions were necessary to keep the scope 
manageable: patient’s abnormal sensitivities to drugs were ignored, as were drug-related 
problems not associated with the operation of the device; smart pump technology was also 
ignored, because it is only widespread in affluent healthcare institutions and it would bring a 
whole different set of risk factors to the study; finally, “wrong drug” cases were only consid-
ered when associated with IV-line mix-ups. 
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Fig. 18: Connections between fundamental conditions and triggers in the third case study. 
The fourth step was to describe the processes and workspace. 
The infusion pump setup process was split into five sub-processes: “Gather Mate-
rials”, “Prepare Infusion Bag”, “Prepare Administration Set”, “Prepare Infusion Pump”, and 
“Start Infusion”, each of them was composed of multiple tasks, as observed in Fig. 19. These 
data were registered in the Process Description Form, along with the workspace elements 
involved in each sub-process. 
A total of eight workspace elements were associated with these sub-processes: 
professionals, drip stand, medication bag, administration set, infusion pump, prescription, 
patient, and facility. Element descriptions included multiple characteristics that may appear in 
their respective classes and they were mainly based on the references (e.g., “medication bag” 
was described as three potential characteristics: “label legibility, multiple medication bags, 
inadequate infusion portal”). The workspace elements descriptions were registered in the 
Workspace Description Form. 
The fifth step was to identify the triggers for this case. The combinations between 
three fundamental conditions and four subprocesses provided 22 different triggers (the “Gath-
er Materials” sub-process was ignored because triggers related to this sub-process can be as-
sociated with the other four with no loss to the study). The triggers and their relations to the 
sub-processes and fundamental conditions were registered in the Triggers Form. 
Fig. 18 (above) shows how the fundamental conditions and triggers are connected 
in this case. It should be noted the elevated number of triggers in the figure required them to 
Incident 
Conditions
Triggers
Inadequate drug dose 
delivered to patient 
by infusion pump
Reduced dose/
No delivery
Rate variationIncreased dose
Infusion 
bag not 
spiked
Improper 
bag height
Improper 
clamp 
positioning
Kinked 
tubing
Improper 
multiple 
drug 
delivery
Infusate 
leakage
Misconnection
Inclined 
drip 
chamber
Misprogramming
Tubing 
switch
Occlusion 
of pump 
intake
Tampering 
(patient/
family)
Device 
malfunction
Resetting 
behavior
Power/
battery 
failure
EMI/supply 
voltage error
Drug 
reservoir 
detachment
Administration 
set variation
Delay in 
corrections/
adjustments
Post 
occlusion 
bolus
Too many 
bolus 
requests
Uneven bolus 
delivered by 
pump
84 
 
 
be disposed at the Triggers level of the Risk Factors Map in such a way that they would fit a 
single figure, but the actual map had to be split into multiple parts. 
1. Gather materials
a. Medication bag
b. Drip Stand
c. Administration Set
d. Infusion Pump
2.Prepare Infusion 
Bag
a.Check prescription 
and bag
b. Register data
c. Label additional 
drugs
d. Unpack and hang 
solution
3.Prepare 
Administration Set
a. Unpack set
b. Clamp line
c. Spike bag
d. Fill drip chamber
e. Fill line with 
solution
f. Verify air bubbles
g.  Replace cap on 
the end of the set
4.Prepare Infusion 
Pump
a. Check if pump is fit 
for purpose
b. Program pump 
according to 
prescription
c. Attach 
administration set
d. Check pump 
settings again
5.Start Infusion
a. Check prescription
b. Check cannula for 
infection
c. Attach infusion to 
cannula
d. Record  time
e. Start pump
f. Ensure correct 
infusion and no 
adverse effects
 
Fig. 19: Process diagram for infusion 
The sixth step was to identify the immediate risk factors. The descriptions of the 
workspace elements were associated with the 22 triggers and 28 immediate risk factors were 
identified. The total of connections between triggers and immediate factors was 98, the mini-
mum being two immediate factors for some triggers (e.g., the “Improper bag height” trigger 
was associated with “drip stand height” and “training”), and the maximum being thirteen im-
mediate factors for “Misprogramming” (e.g., “display legibility”, “lack of safety features”, 
and “poor pump usability”). The immediate factors were placed at the Workspace level of the 
Risk Factors Map, as presented in the excerpt associated with the “Device malfunction” trig-
ger in Fig. 20. The connections between triggers and immediate risk factors were registered in 
the Immediate Risk Factors Form. 
The seventh step was to identify the remote risk factors. After considering poten-
tial operational and design causes for each immediate risk factor and then for the chained re-
mote factors, a total of 36 remote risk factors were identified, mostly based on the references: 
25 at the organizational level of the socio-technical system (e.g., “maintenance protocols” and 
“technical specifications”) and 11 at the external level (e.g., “Technical requirements” and 
“quality standards”). Direct connections between immediate and remote factors totaled 52; 
indirect ones (chained remote connections) totaled 29. The remote risk factors and their con-
nections were registered in the Remote Risk Factors Form and placed at the top levels of the 
Risk Factors Map. Fig. 20 presents the fourteen remote risk factors associated with the “De-
vice malfunction” trigger. 
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The last step, Classification, was simplified: because this case presents a generic 
map based on the literature and other references, all factors were considered reasonable. The 
only classification criterion was that factors with no reference to their influence on the health 
care system would be classified as dismissed, but there was no such case. Factors at the exter-
nal level were classified as reasonable without classification checks because analyses of leg-
islation and standards were out of scope. The Classification Form shows the references that 
indicate the influence of each risk factor in the system. 
The complete forms and maps related to this case are presented in Appendix L. 
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Fig. 20: Excerpt from the Risk Factors Map – factors related to the “Device malfunction” trigger.  
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6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this research has been to develop a prospective method for mapping 
risk factors at different levels of the health care system based on key concepts of accident 
causation in complex socio-technical systems and to test it with case studies. 
This chapter is divided into three sections: in the first section, cases studies are 
compared and the findings, difficulties, and limitations in their execution and consistency 
issues among them are considered; in the next section, the accident causation model and the 
risk factors mapping method are examined in light of the results and compared with other 
models and tools present in the literature; in the last section, study limitations, possible appli-
cations, and future research topics are discussed and a concluding statement is given. 
6.1 THE CASE STUDIES 
The original purpose of this thesis was to develop a prospective method for map-
ping risk factors in the socio-technical health care system. Secondary – and necessary – objec-
tives of the thesis were to merge multiple accident causation concepts into a single model and 
to test the developed method on multiple case studies. 
Three cases were devised for that purpose, each one focused on a different aspect 
of the health care system: the first one was based on a potential failure at a specific instrument 
processing environment; the second, on a regulatory critical incident associated with medical 
devices; and the third, on a specific type of medical device. The results for each case were 
presented in the previous chapter, but they require some consideration before the method it-
self and the model upon which it was based can be properly discussed. 
The instrument-cleaning case study, being the more closely structured according 
to the original purpose of the method, was arguably the most hindered by the availability of 
data since no onsite data were collected specifically for this study. 
Although the main data source was a thorough risk analysis built by a multidisci-
plinary team in the course of several meetings, it was still secondhand data: the workspace 
information presented there was overall rich enough to provide an adequate picture of the 
Immediate Health Care System, but the original tool was not focused on higher-level factors. 
The result of that was a somewhat generic description of the chains of factors at the Remote 
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Health Care System – at both the organizational and external levels. Certain workspace ele-
ment descriptions were also found lacking and had to be completed with generic characteris-
tics commonly associated with their kind. 
On the other hand, the resulting risk factors maps were completed with only a few 
adaptations and inclusions. This points out to the value of previous risk analyses as additions 
to data collected on site – or even as the sole references to risk factors maps when combined 
with a team of experts. Accident reports associated with similar critical incidents would prob-
ably have been less useful since they are generally focused on specific elements that played a 
major role in their incidents, although they could still have provided valuable information 
about the triggers associated with them. 
Due to the relative completeness of the tool used for the report upon which the 
first case was based (HFMEA), the application of this method could be considered a struc-
tured graphical representation of a specific potential problem in that specific system. The ad-
ditional data was only necessary to fill some gaps in the new, focused, perspective. 
The other cases, being less specific by nature, did not suffer from the use of pre-
made reports, but they presented some difficulties of their own. 
In the second case, related to the medical devices premarket approval process, 
some concepts related to the socio-technical system hierarchy seemed to have been applied 
more loosely, namely the presence of immediate risk factors associated with regulatory offic-
es, which are generally part of the External level. The contradiction in the method is only ap-
parent and instead of weakening the model, it confirms the Immediate Health Care System 
includes multiple workspaces; it is, however, a warning for the need to adjust the model defi-
nitions when atypical settings are considered – as is the case when the critical incident under 
analysis occurs at the regulatory level. 
Another effect of changing the level at which the critical incident occurs is creat-
ing direct connections between triggers and remote factors at the External level because some 
of the former are requirements directly regulated by some of the latter. It makes certain 
branches of the risk factors maps look like regulatory loophole maps, evoking the aligned 
holes in the accident causation model, but they only apply to a small subset of the potential 
medical devices market entry scenarios. 
Since the third case was a generic risk factors map, it did not present structural 
challenges to the model or data limitations due to restrictive reference selection, but it re-
quired the most caution when defining the scope of analysis, especially due to its generic na-
ture. Good data sources made it simple to develop generic descriptions of the infusion process 
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and the workspace elements, but certain trends had to be ignored due to scope restrictions and 
to the dissimilar nature of some problems associated with them – smart pump technology, for 
example, is currently a very popular topic, but it brings IT issues, such as interoperability and 
library management, to the table. 
The case studies, as a whole, seemed to show the Risk Factors Map proposed in 
this thesis as an adequate way to display risk factors information pertaining to different levels 
– and angles – of the health care socio-technical system. The fact that no specific incident 
report was used as the basis for any of the case studies indicates that prospective data can be 
used to develop risk factors maps in a socio-technical framework. 
The most obvious limitation of the case studies was their execution by a single in-
dividual instead of a team – contrarily to what is recommended by the method. This limitation 
was mitigated by the use of a multidisciplinary report in the first case; by the absence of a 
specific workspace in the second; and by the generic nature of the map in the third – although 
health care personnel expertise would certainly have improved the analyses, especially during 
process and workspace descriptions. 
Besides case limitations, there were also inconsistencies in their execution. The 
aforementioned “workspace” definition adjustment for the medical devices regulations case is 
one of them. 
There is also certain inconsistency in the distribution of risk factors in their re-
spective forms among the different cases: in the first and second cases, the triggers in the Im-
mediate Risk Factors forms follow the same sequence they appeared in the Table of Triggers, 
but they are ordered alphabetically in the third case; the Remote Risk Factors forms are also 
organized inconsistently, with factors distributed in order of distance from workspace in the 
first and third cases – i.e., first all immediate risk factors, then direct remote factors connected 
to them, then the chained remote factors – and separated in two forms associated with the 
Fundamental Conditions in the second case. 
Although such inconsistencies might suggest insufficient or flawed instructions 
for filling the forms, they might as well just indicate that the data distributions in the forms 
mirror, to a certain extent, their respective case structures: the alphabetical order for the im-
mediate factors in the third case might thus be caused by the impossibility of separating the 
triggers by fundamental condition, since many of those are connected to more than one of 
these; similarly, the separation of remote risk factors in two forms in the second case was only 
made possible by the reduced number of factors for the case and by the relative independence 
of factors between the two main fundamental condition branches.  
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Considering all these variations in structure, it might be helpful for analysts to 
write down explicit descriptions of what is included in each hierarchical level of the map. 
6.2 THE MODEL AND THE METHOD 
The application of the method to diverse situations suggest the proposed accident 
causation model offers an adequate mental framework for the prospective identification of 
risk factors in health care because, despite the need for adjusting the workspace definition to 
include regulatory offices, the analyses followed the same basic pattern: critical incident re-
quires certain conditions that are provided by triggering events at the workspace due (mainly) 
to imperfections in the workspace elements and those imperfections are there due to problems 
at the levels where decisions are made. 
Although the model integrates elements from different systems and tools, certain 
care was taken to avoid the use of conflicting concepts: Reason’s Swiss Cheese model (Rea-
son, 1990) is reinterpreted as a series of barriers not formed by multiple hierarchical levels, 
but shaped by them; the socio-technical framework (Rasmussen, 1997; Leveson, 2004) ex-
plains how the barriers are shaped by higher hierarchical levels; and the workspace level dy-
namics, not detailed by the other models, is described in terms of human error (Reason, 1990) 
and other system failures – especially associated with HFMEA (DeRosier et al., 2002) and 
Shepherd’s System (Shepherd, 1998). 
To the best of the author`s knowledge, the risk factors-mapping method designed 
after this model is the first attempt to provide instructions for the prospective risk analysis of 
socio-technical systems. 
Besides the benefit of mitigating the culture of blame by focusing on hypothetical 
events instead of investigating actual accidents, the method’s structure also shifts the focus of 
analysis from a linear perspective – which generally departs from a single identifiable error 
associated with a health care professional – to a more systemic approach that considers acci-
dents to be the result of complex interactions provided by multiple factors at different levels 
of the socio-technical system. 
By highlighting the fact that certain conditions are necessary for a critical incident 
to happen and showing that multiple triggers – even routine actions – may provide them, the 
method confirms that “error-free delivery of health care is a utopia” (Cuschieri, 2006) and it 
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makes potential errors more visible, presenting them as signals that may “indicate incubating 
accidents in the system” (Dien et al., 2012). 
As indicated by Nieva and Sorra (2003), who discussed RCA and HFMEA, being 
prospective does not completely eliminate staff resistance to expose weaknesses in the pro-
cesses under their responsibility, partly due to “fear of challenging the institutional hierar-
chy”, and that’s why the involvement of senior management is necessary before collecting 
workspace data. For this method, specifically, management cooperation is even more critical 
later, when collecting data at the organizational level. 
Because the Risk Factors Map takes AcciMap as its main reference, it may have 
similar problems: first, it might require some formal training before people are able to use it 
properly – which Sklet (2004) classifies as an ‘expert’ level; second, it has some reliability 
and validity issues (Branford, 2007; Goode et al., 2017; Waterson et al., 2017; Gonçalves Fil-
ho et al., 2019) that, although do not recommend against the use of the tool, do require the 
subjectivity and judgment applied during analysis to be considered when basing practical de-
cisions on its results.  The method also shares some of AcciMap’s advantages, such as “the 
capacity to take the big picture into account, identifying factors from within the organiza-
tion(s) involved as well as other interrelated bodies” and the ability to distil “large quantities 
of information about the contributing factors and their interrelationships into a single dia-
gram” (Branford, 2011). 
Due to its prospective nature and the influence of multiple risk analysis and inci-
dent investigation tools, there are some differences between the Risk Factors Map and other 
AcciMap approaches (Svedung & Rasmussen, 2002; Branford et al., 2009): first, it is not 
aimed at providing recommendations for correcting the system, only at diagnosing system 
problems by analyzing hypothetical failures; second, it does not consider causal connection 
between risk factors and triggers, only potential influence – which leaves causal strength 
threshold criteria entirely to analysts’ judgment; and third, while AcciMaps are focused on 
describing complex chains of events leading to a critical incident, the Risk Factors Map is 
focused on providing multiple scenarios for it. 
It should be finally noted that the systemic approach enforced by the method 
should not be considered a complete dismissal of the individual approach: proficiency in exe-
cution is fundamental to health care (Cuschieri, 2005) and accountability tells the public that 
the system does not favor the professionals over the patients (Walton, 2004). Systemic anal-
yses should thus be inserted in a “Just Culture” (Sculli & Hemphill, 2013), where fair proce-
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dures are used to “draw the line between conduct deserving of discipline and conduct for 
which discipline is neither appropriate nor helpful.”  
6.3 CONCLUSIONS 
Although the accident causation model developed for this study comprehends the 
whole socio-technical health care system and merges solid elements from the Risk Manage-
ment and Safety domain, certain concepts might seem odd to those used to more traditional 
models. The concept of “barrier” used here is associated with the absence of flaws in the 
workspace elements – in contrast to its more traditional definition related to specific safety 
mechanisms or processes intended to prevent the propagation of error. 
Since the method was built upon the identification of systemic flaws at multiple 
hierarchical levels, it is eminently diagnostic, and, thus, does not provide certain desirable 
features, such as rating risks or proposing corrections. 
The method, however, might have useful applications, such as planning critical 
incident scenarios for high fidelity simulations, assessing the current system’s resistance to a 
particular type of incident, and revealing systemic flaws that might require further investiga-
tion. 
Since the method suffers from the lack of taxonomies of contributing factors, as 
occurs with the AcciMap (Goode et al., 2017; Waterson et al., 2017; Grant et al., 2018), future 
studies might add specific error taxonomies for the Organizational and External system levels 
(similar to the Classes of Triggers table). Comparisons between Risk Factors Maps for similar 
critical incidents in different types of health care organizations might be helpful to evaluate 
validity and reliability. 
The addition of a structured quantitative analysis stage might provide more robust 
capabilities for prioritizing which risk factors demand a closer look. It would require experts 
to evaluate the contributory factors, as has been tried with AcciMap (Wang et al., 2018), or 
incident report systems to feed the analyses with plentiful and accurate risk factors data 
(which is a challenge in itself). 
Considering the differences among the three case studies and the comprehensive-
ness of the accident causation model developed for this study, it seems the risk factors map-
ping method is suitable for prospective analyses of the healthcare socio-technical system. 
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Hopefully, the Risk Factors Map will be used as a diagnostic tool for revealing 
flaws in specific workspaces and the associated system – or at least the ideas explored in this 
study will encourage researchers and risk management teams to move the focus of their ef-
forts from incident investigations to prospective analyses and from workspace issues to sys-
temic factors. 
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APPENDIX A - ANALYSIS INFORMATION FORM 
Critical Incident (Short name for the Critical Incident – section 4.1): 
      
Description (Brief description of the Critical Incident – section 4.1): 
      
  
  
  
Analysis Team (Names of the analysis team members – section 4.1) 
  
  
  
Keywords (List of keywords for topics associated with the Critical Incident – section 
4.2)     
  
  
  
References (Main initial references to the topics associated with the Keywords – section 4.2): 
   
  
  
  
  
Fundamental Conditions (List of Fundamental Conditions for the 
Critical Incident – section 4.3): 
     
  
(Draw logical relations 
here)   
    
   
  
    
   
  
    
   
  
    
   
  
    
   
  
    
   
  
    
   
  
    
   
  
    
   
  
         
          Scope (List of restrictions to the analysis – section 4.3): 
       
  
  
  
Notes 
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APPENDIX B – PROCESS DESCRIPTION FORM 
Process Name (name of process potentially associated with the critical incident – section 4.4): 
  
Description (general description of the process – section 4.4): 
  
  
  
  
  
          Subprocess (part of the 
process) 
Elements Involved (list the elements involved in each subprocess: consid-
er device, facility, patient, team, supply, and environment components): 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
                    
  
        
  
  
        
  
         
  
         
  
         
  
         
  
         
  
  
        
  
  
        
  
  
        
  
  
        
  
  
        
  
  
        
  
  
        
  
                  (Draft process here) 
Notes 
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APPENDIX C – WORKSPACE DESCRIPTION FORM 
1. List elements involved in the subprocesses in the Element column. Place a new element after the previous 
description (section 4.4). 
2. Write a general description of the kind of element in the Description column. Use as many rows as neces-
sary (section 4.4). 
Element Description             
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
Notes 
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APPENDIX D – TRIGGERS FORM 
[Based on section 4.5] 
1. List Fundamental Conditions in the Fundamental Condition column (one per row); 
2. List processes where the fundamental condition might emerge in the Process column (one per row); 
3. List potential triggers that might occur at the specific process in the Trigger column (one per row). 
Fundamental Condition Process Trigger 
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
          Notes: 
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APPENDIX E – IMMEDIATE RISK FACTORS FORM 
[Based on section 4.6] 
1. List Trigger in the Trigger column (one per row); 
2. List Immediate Risk Factors associated with each trigger in the Immediate Risk Factors column. 
Trigger Immediate Risk Factors 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
          Notes:                   
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APPENDIX F – REMOTE RISK FACTORS FORM 
[Based on section 4.7] 
  1. List immediate risk factors in the Lower Factor column (one per row); 
  2. List remote risk factors directly associated with them in the Higher Factor column (one per row); 
3. Copy the remote risk factors to the left column (one per row); 
   4. List the chained remote factors in higher levels in the right column (one per row); 
 5. Repeat steps 3 and 4 until there are no more new chained remote factors in higher levels. 
 
          Lower Factor Higher Factor 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
          Notes: 
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APPENDIX G – CLASSIFICATION FORM 
[Based on section 4.8] 
1. List map elements (condition/trigger, factor) in the Map Element column (one per row); 
2. Check "C" for Confirmed factors, "R" for Reasonable factors, and "D" for Dismissed factors; 
3. List references to back up the selected status in the Evidence column. 
Status 
Map Element Evidence 
C R D 
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
             Notes: 
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APPENDIX H – GUIDELINES FOR MAPPING 
Risk Factors Maps tend to become very complex due to the number of elements (con-
ditions, triggers, immediate risk factors, and remote risk factors) and the connections between 
them. The brief guidelines below might be useful for improving the readability of Risk Factor 
Maps. 
Element names in textboxes should be as short as possible to keep the boxes small. 
Lower box width is more important than lower box height in order to allow for a higher densi-
ty of textboxes per map without compromising clarity too much. The middle section of map 
elements should not be obstructed by other elements above or below them if they are connect-
ed to other map elements in those directions. Common words might be abbreviated, but boxes 
should be wide enough to prevent words from being broken into multiple lines. Text fonts 
shouldn’t be lower than 8 (the usual limit for figures). 
Connectors between map elements should follow a pattern: straight down from the 
higher element, then turn horizontally towards the lower element, and then finally turn 
straight down to the lower element. Multiple connectors from the same higher element must 
be aligned at the horizontal level. There must be enough blank space between map levels to 
prevent horizontal lines of different higher factors from aligning. Connectors should always 
start at the lower midsection of the higher level element and end with an arrow at the upper 
midsection of the higher element. 
Logical operators (AND/OR) should only be used to describe relations between condi-
tions and the critical incident and between triggers and conditions. 
Even with careful positioning of textboxes and connectors, it may be necessary to split 
a Risk factors map into multiple parts to make them fit into the selected page sizes. The pri-
ority for splitting maps must be bottom up, using operators as connection references between 
maps: start by splitting the branches related to different conditions into different maps; if the 
maps associated with certain conditions still won’t fit in the page, split the map into two 
groups of triggers (perhaps just separating a specific trigger connected to the larger number of 
risk factors). Due to the complexity of interactions between system levels, it might be neces-
sary to try different arrangements before finding one where all maps fit in their pages. 
  
112 
 
 
APPENDIX I – GUIDELINES FOR REPORTING 
After finishing the analysis, the analysts should make a thorough report on what they 
found in their study. 
The report should not require deep knowledge of the method presented in the thesis to 
understand the main findings but should present all the necessary information for those who 
might wish to verify the premises upon which the study was done. 
We suggest the final document to be composed by a Brief Report and multiple appen-
dices with the data. 
The Brief Report should be composed of four main sections: Introduction, Methodolo-
gy, Results, and Summary and Recommendations. 
The aim of the Introduction is to answer what the analysis is about. It should start by 
presenting the general topic of the analysis and then proceed to indicate the motivation to as-
sess risk factors associated with the topic. This should be followed by a very brief description 
of the method and of the critical incident (e.g., “Prospectively map the risk factors associated 
with critical incident X”). Finally, a brief description of main scope limitations and the list of 
analysts involved (possibly, only their professional background – e.g., “The analysis team was 
composed by a pathologist, a clinical engineer, and a human factors specialist”). 
The Methodology section indicates how the analysis was done. It should first present 
the criteria for selecting the analysis team members and a brief description of the main refer-
ences used in the analysis. After that, it should present the reasoning for the Fundamental 
Conditions identified. Following the conditions, all the processes considered during analysis 
should be indicated. A brief – and generic – description of the other steps should also be in-
cluded, with practical considerations on how triggers and risk factors were identified. A more 
detailed account of the study limitations should also be provided in this section. Finally, the 
criteria for determining the relevance of map elements should be explained. 
The Results section should present the issues – and also the particularly positive sys-
tem characteristics – found during analysis. The confirmed Risk Factors and other map ele-
ments should be highlighted and a simplified Risk Factors Map should be included. 
The Summary and Recommendations section should present a brief description of the 
main findings in the risk factors analysis and a list of issues in order of priority – the most 
relevant and manageable, i.e., controllable by the organization, should be placed higher on the 
list.  
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APPENDIX J – CASE 1 DATA 
Forms: 
-Analysis Information Form 
-Process Description Form 
-Workspace Description Form 
-Triggers Form 
-Immediate Risk Factors Form 1 
-Immediate Risk Factors Form 2 
-Remote Risk Factors Form 1 
-Remote Risk Factors Form 2 
-Classification Form 
-References 
 
Maps: 
-Map 1 
-Map 2 
-Map 3 
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ANALYSIS INFORMATION FORM 
Critical Incident (Short name for the Critical Incident): 
    Dirty or moist instrument leaves cleaning area       
Description (Brief description of the Critical Incident): 
    Instrument passes through the cleaning area, but it is not properly cleaned and dried.  
                    
                    
Analysis Team 
        Only the PhD Candidate        
                    
                    
Keywords (List of keywords for topics associated with the Critical Incident)     
Sterilization; cleaning materials; medical device processing         
                    
                    
References (Main initial references to the topics associated with the Keywords): 
  HFMEA report from dissertation (Almeida, 2014);        
Sterilization Manual for Health Centers (Acosta-Gnass & Stempliuk, 2010)         
RDC 15/2012 - requisitos de boas práticas para o processamento de produtos para saúde (ANVISA, 
2012) 
Guideline for Disinfection and Sterilization in Healthcare Facilities (Rutala & Weber, 2008) 
Fundamental Conditions (List of Fundamental Conditions 
for the Critical Incident): 
     
(A) Instrument is dirty;     
(Draw logical relations 
here)     
(B) Instrument is moist;     (A+B).C 
   
  
(C) Instrument proceeds to other processing stages           
   
  
 
          
 
  
  
           
   
  
            
   
  
            
   
  
            
   
  
                 
          Scope (List of restrictions to the analysis): 
     Only factors related to the cleaning area of a specific hospital    
Only processes related to instrument cleaning           
Only non-automated processes                   
                    
Notes 
                    
                    
                    
 
  
A B C 
Critical Incident 
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PROCESS DESCRIPTION FORM 
Process Name (name of process potentially associated with the critical incident): 
Manual cleaning of surgical instruments 
Description (general description of the process): 
Dirty instrument is received at the cleaning area. Then, it is brushed with water and detergents,  
rinsed and dried with towels or compressed air 
  
  
          Subprocess (part of 
the process) 
Elements Involved (list the elements involved in each subprocess: consider 
device, facility, patient, team, supply, and environment components): 
brushing bench, sinks, brushes, detergents, professionals, lighting, PPEs, water,  
  instruments 
    
rinsing 
bench, sinks, professionals, water (variable quality), PPEs, lighting, instru-
ments 
    
    
drying bench, professionals, cloths, compressed air terminal, lighting, instruments 
    
    
validation bench, professionals, lighting, instruments, test kits 
    
    
                    
Brushing
a. Apply 
detergent
b. Brush
Rinsing
a. select proper 
water source
b. rinse with 
abundant 
amount of water
Drying
a. Dry with cloth
OR
b. dry with 
compressed air
Validation
a. visual 
inspection
b. chemical 
controls (visible 
dirt test, 
disinfection test)
 
  
                  (Draft process here) 
Notes 
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WORKSPACE DESCRIPTION FORM 
1. List elements involved in the subprocesses in the Element column. 
2. Write a general description of the kind of element in the Description column. Use as many rows as necessary. 
Element Description 
water there's not enough reverse osmosis water, reverse osmosis system is 
  broken, poor supply planning, low quality piped water, filters 'saturated' due 
  to the poor maintenance schedule 
    
working area the area is not large enough; there's no air conditioning; excessive noise; 
  waste accumulation (in bins); dust accumulation on furniture; presence of 
  insects in the room 
    
cloths no data on report* 
    
compressed air there are too few terminals and they are not always working 
    
carts inadequate dimensions; inadequate usage protocols; insufficient/inadequate 
  metal boxes for instruments 
    
brushes too low quantity; not enough diameter variety 
    
validation tests tests not available (no funds). 
    
detergents dilution procedures are ignored; team forgets adequate quantity 
    
lighting inadequate/insufficient 
    
energy there's no emergency power supply to the cleaning area 
    
instruments low-quality material; abused during procedures (damage); not regularly 
  replaced; bad design prevents cleaning and internal inspection; disassembly 
  and precleaning protocols are ignored; manual checklist 
    
team insufficient training; deficient supervision; deficient communication; high 
  workload; stress; lack of qualified personnel; high turnover; low morale/ 
  commitment; deficient protocols; alcohol abuse; distraction; occasionally, 
  omit certain activities (e.g., inspections) 
    
    
Notes 
         *assume there are no immediate risk factors associated 
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TRIGGERS FORM 
1. List Fundamental Conditions in the Fundamental Condition column (one per row);  
2. List processes where the fundamental condition might emerge in the Process column (one per row); 
3. List potential triggers that might occur at the specific process in the Trigger column (one per row). 
Fundamental Condition Process Trigger 
Dirty instrument Brushing Deficient brushing 
    Incomplete brushing 
    Materials incompatible with dirt 
      
  Rinsing Deficient rinsing 
    Incomplete rinsing 
    Contact with dirt after rinsing 
      
      
Moist instrument Drying Deficient drying 
    Incomplete drying 
    Contact with moisture after drying 
      
Instrument is approved Validation Improper inspection 
    Ignored inspection 
    Tests not performed 
    Test results ignored 
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
          Notes:          
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IMMEDIATE RISK FACTORS FORM 
1. List Trigger in the Trigger column (one per row); 
2. List Immediate Risk Factors associated with each trigger in the Immediate Risk Factors column. 
Trigger Immediate Risk Factor 
Deficient brushing small space 
  instrument design 
  inadequate training 
  inadequate brushes 
  workload 
  inadequate lighting 
    
Incomplete brushing inadequate brushes 
  inadequate training 
  instrument design 
    
Materials incompatible with the type of dirt detergent quality 
  inadequate brushes 
    
Deficient rinsing inadequate water quality 
  instrument design 
  inadequate training 
  inadequate lighting 
  insufficient reverse osmosis water 
    
incomplete rinsing instrument design 
  insufficient reverse osmosis water 
    
Contact with dirt after rinsing small space 
  dirt accumulation 
  presence of insects 
  distracted 
    
Deficient drying instrument design 
  inadequate training 
  workload 
  inadequate lighting 
  unavailable air terminal 
    
Incomplete drying inadequate training 
  instrument design 
          Notes: 
 (1 of 2) 
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IMMEDIATE RISK FACTORS FORM 
1. List Trigger in the Trigger column (one per row); 
2. List Immediate Risk Factors associated with each trigger in the Immediate Risk Factors column. 
Trigger Immediate Risk Factor 
Contact with moisture after drying distracted 
  inadequate space 
    
Deficient inspection workload 
  distracted 
  inadequate lighting 
    
Ignored inspection inadequate training 
  low morale 
  workload 
  inadequate supervision 
    
Tests not performed inadequate training 
  workload  
  no test kits 
  low morale 
    
Test results are ignored workload 
  inadequate training 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
  
Notes: 
 (2 of 2) 
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REMOTE RISK FACTORS FORM 
1. List immediate risk factors in the Lower Factor column (one per row); 
  2. List remote risk factors directly associated with them in the Higher Factor column (one per row); 
3. Copy the remote risk factors to the left column (one per row); 
   4. List the chained remote factors in higher levels in the right column (one per row); 
 5. Repeat steps 3 and 4 until there are no more new chained remote factors in higher levels. 
 
          Lower Factor Higher Factor 
detergent quality deficient materials management* 
distracted out of scope 
dirt accumulation inadequate facility management 
high workload insufficient workforce 
  low automation 
inadequate brushes deficient materials management* 
inadequate lighting inadequate facility design 
  deficient materials management* 
inadequate supervision insufficient workforce 
  inadequate task assignment 
inadequate water quality inadequate facility management* 
instrument design deficient materials management* 
insufficient reverse osmosis water deficient materials management* 
low morale out of scope 
no test kits deficient materials management* 
    
presence of insects inadequate facility design 
small space out of scope 
inadequate training deficient training program 
    
unavailable air terminal deficient materials management* 
room not climatized inadequate facility design 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
          Notes:          
*Not explicitly indicated in the study. Derived from other factors. 
 (1/2)                   
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REMOTE RISK FACTORS FORM 
1. List immediate risk factors in the Lower Factor column (one per row); 
  2. List remote risk factors directly associated with them in the Higher Factor column (one per row); 
3. Copy the remote risk factors to the left column (one per row); 
   4. List the chained remote factors in higher levels in the right column (one per row); 
 5. Repeat steps 3 and 4 until there are no more new chained remote factors in higher levels. 
 
          Lower Factor Higher Factor 
deficient materials management* poor communication protocols* 
  no funds 
  deficient procurement process* 
deficient training program deficient personnel requirements* 
inadequate task assignment deficient personnel requirements* 
inadequate facility design legal operational requirements* 
  no funds 
inadequate facility management legal operational requirements* 
insufficient workforce no funds 
low automation no funds 
  legal operational requirements* 
no funds state budget 
  reimbursement rates - SUS 
deficient personnel requirements* legal operational requirements* 
deficient procurement process* restrictive procurement law 
legal operational requirements* out of scope 
poor communication protocols* out of scope 
    
restrictive procurement law out of scope 
state budget out of scope 
reimbursement rates - SUS out of scope 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
          Notes: 
*Not explicitly indicated in the study. Derived from other factors. 
 (2 of 2) 
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CLASSIFICATION FORM 
1. List map elements (condition/trigger, factor) in the Map Element column (one per row); 
2. Check "C" for Confirmed factors, "R" for Reasonable factors, and "D" for Dismissed factors; 
3. Indicate data to back up the selected status in the Justification column. 
Status 
Map Element Justification 
C R D 
    X detergent quality Probability 1 
X     dirt accumulation Probability 4 
X     distracted Probability 4 
  X   high workload Probability 3 
X     inadequate brushes Probability 4 
  X   inadequate lighting Probability 3* 
 
  X inadequate supervision Probability 1 
  X   inadequate training Probability 2 
  X   inadequate water quality Probability 2 
X     instrument design Probability 4 
X     insufficient reverse osmosis water Probability 4 
  X   low morale Probability 3 
X     no test kits Probability 4 
  X   presence of insects Probability 3 
X     room not climatized Probability 4 
    X small space Probability 1 
X     unavailable air terminal Probability 4* 
  X   deficient materials management Probability 3* 
  X   deficient training program Probability 2** 
X     inadequate facility design Probability 4 
  X   inadequate facility management Probability 2 
  X   insufficient workforce Probability 3 
X     low automation Probability 4 
X     no funds Probability 4 
  X   inadequate professional requirements Probability 2** 
  X   deficient procurement process Probability 2** 
    X legal operational requirements *** 
  X   poor communication protocols *** 
  X   restrictive procurement law Probability 2** 
 
X 
 
state budget *** 
 
X 
 
reimbursement rates - SUS *** 
Notes:               
-Classification based on probability ratings defined by the multidisciplinary team in the HFMEA 
study 
-Confirmed factors are those with probability scores of 4; 
-Dismissed factors are those with probability scores of 1; 
-The remaining factors are considered Relevant (those with probability scores 2 or 3). 
*Related probabilities vary. 
**Probability not explicitly indicated in the study. It was based on related factors’ ratings. 
*** Probability was not indicated in the report. Status based on literature. 
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APPENDIX K – CASE 2 DATA 
Forms: 
-Analysis Information Form 
-Process Description Form 
-Workspace Description Form 
- Triggers Form 
-Immediate Risk Factors Form 
-Remote Risk Factors Form 1 
-Remote Risk Factors Form 2 
-Classification Form 1 
-Classification Form 2 
-References 
 
Maps: 
-Map 1 
-Map 2 
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ANALYSIS INFORMATION FORM 
Critical Incident (Short name for the Critical Incident): 
A hazardous medical device legally reaches healthcare in Brazil. 
Description (Brief description of the Critical Incident): 
A medical device is hazardous but the regulatory system does not prevent it from reaching the 
market. 
  
Analysis Team 
Only the PhD Candidate 
  
Keywords (List of keywords for topics associated with the Critical Incident) 
Premarket approval; medical devices; Good Manufacturing Practices; Medical Device Regulations; 
medical device incidents; risk management 
  
References (Main initial references to the topics associated with the Keywords): 
-National regulations on medical devices; 
-International Medical Device Standards; 
-Official medical device incident reports (MAUDE and ANVISA); 
-Publications from manufacturers, service companies, and consultants involved with regulations; 
-Academic papers on medical devices' regulatory issues; 
-Operational reports and staff selection requirements published by ANVISA. 
 Fundamental Conditions (List of Fundamental Conditions for the Critical Incident): 
A - Device has inherently high risk (Draw logical relations here) 
B - Clinical reports are not reproved (A.B)+(C.D) 
C - Device has faulty parts or design 
 
 
D - Technical report is not reproved 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
          Scope (List of restrictions to the analysis): 
-Ignore specific conditions of manufacturing plants, metrology laboratories, and regulator's  
offices, except when they represent the effects of regulatory flaws in the system; 
-The focus is on regulations, thus, potential criminal acts (e.g., bribery and clinical data fabrication) 
were ignored. 
  
Notes 
  
  
  
  
 
A B 
Critical 
Incident 
C D 
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PROCESS DESCRIPTION FORM 
Process Name (name of process potentially associated with the critical incident): 
Medical Device market approval process 
Description (general description of the process): 
Clinical safety is assessed by manufacturers and report is sent to regulators for approval 
  
Manufactured device is sent to testing laboratories for certification and report is sent to regulators 
for approval. 
  
  
Subprocess (part of 
the process) 
Elements Involved (list the elements involved in each subprocess: consider 
device, facility, patient, team, supply, and environment components): 
Clinical assessment clinical assessment system (personnel, resources, protocols), GCP inspectors 
    
    
Device Report  clinical evaluators, technical evaluators (regulators) 
Evaluation   
    
Manufacturing Storage/handling system (facilities, personnel, supplies), quality control,  
  GMP inspectors 
    
Certification Device certification system (protocols, personnel, resources) 
    
 
Manufacturing
Device 
Certification
Report 
Evaluation
Clinical 
Assessment
 
 
 (Draft process here) 
Notes 
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WORKSPACE DESCRIPTION FORM 
1. List elements involved in the subprocesses in the Element column. Place new element after the previous description. 
2. Write a general description of the kind of element in the Description column. Use as many rows as necessary. 
Element Description 
Clinical assessment Performance might be affected by personnel and available resources. 
system Also by clinical assessment protocols. Specific laboratory conditions ignored. 
  Protocols harmonized with international standards, consider adequate. 
    
GCP inspectors Performance might be affected by training and inadequate task assignment. 
    
    
Clinical report Evaluators' performance might be influenced by training, clinical evaluation 
evaluators protocols, and inadequate task assignment. There are no guidelines for 
  systematic risk/benefit analyses. Some areas at ANVISA seem to have a 
  potentially insufficient number of professionals, especially those with  
  background in STEM areas. 
    
GMP inspectors Performance might be influenced by training and inadequate task assignment 
  
GMP inspections do not consider types of devices, only risk classes (and not 
all of them).  
  Lack of inspectors, especially for medical devices. 
    
Storage/handling Influenced by protocols and GMP inspections. Storage and handling  
resources requirements seem comprehensive. 
    
Quality control Influenced by protocols and GMP inspections. GMP requirements seem 
  comprehensive. 
    
Device certification Influenced by personnel, resources, and protocols. Only explicitly indicated 
system standards are mandatory. There are not national standards for every type of 
  medical devices. 
    
Technical report Performance might be influenced by training, technical evaluation 
evaluators protocols, and inadequate task assignment. Low number of professionals 
  with STEM background. No guidelines for systematic technology evaluations. 
    
    
    
    
Notes 
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TRIGGERS FORM 
1. List Fundamental Conditions in the Fundamental Condition column (one per row); 
2. List processes where the fundamental condition might emerge in the Process column (one per row); 
3. List potential triggers that might occur at the specific process in the Trigger column (one per row). 
Fundamental Condition Process Trigger 
Device has inherently high risk Clinical Benefits outweigh risks 
   Assessment Clinical assessment fails to reveal hazards 
      
Failure to reprove clinical report Clinical Report  No clinical evaluation required 
  Evaluation Clinical report is approved by mistake 
      
Device has faulty parts or design Manufacturing Manufacturer employs faulty parts or design 
    Parts deteriorate after device is assembled 
      
Failure to reprove technical Certification Technical tests fail to reveal faulty parts/ 
report   design 
      
  Technical report Technical tests are not required 
  evaluation Technical report is approved by mistake 
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
  
Notes: 
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IMMEDIATE RISK FACTORS FORM 
1. List Trigger in the Trigger column (one per row); 
2. List Immediate Risk Factors associated with each trigger in the Immediate Risk Factors column. 
Trigger Immediate Risk Factors 
Benefits outweigh risks None.* 
    
Clinical assessment fails to reveal hazards Inadequate GCP inspectors 
  Inadequate clinical assessment system**** 
    
No clinical evaluation required None** 
    
Clinical report is approved by mistake Inadequate clinical report evaluators 
    
Manufacturer employs faulty parts or design Poor quality control 
  Inadequate storage/handling conditions 
  Inadequate GMP inspectors 
    
    
Parts deteriorate after device is assembled Inadequate storage/handling conditions 
  Inadequate GMP inspectors 
    
Tests fail to reveal faulty parts/design Inadequate technical testing system***** 
    
    
Technical tests are not required None*** 
    
Technical report is approved by mistake Inadequate technical report evaluators 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
  
Notes: 
*Remote factor: RDC 56/2001 indicates some risks might be acceptable in relation to expected bene-
fits. ** Remote factor: Inadequate Clinical Assessment Requirements 
*** Remote factor: Inadequate technical testing requirements 
**** Includes clinical personnel and resources, which are out of the scope 
***** Includes technical personnel and resources, which are out of the scope 
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REMOTE RISK FACTORS FORM 
1. List immediate risk factors in the Lower Factor column (one per row); 
  2. List remote risk factors directly associated with them in the Higher Factor column (one per row); 
3. Copy the remote risk factors to the left column (one per row); 
   4. List the chained remote factors in higher levels in the right column (one per row); 
 5. Repeat steps 3 and 4 until there are no more new chained remote factors in higher levels. 
 
          Lower Factor Higher Factor 
Inadequate GCP inspectors Inadequate GCP task assignment 
  Inadequate GCP training program 
Inadequate clinical assessment system Inadequate assessment protocols 
    
Inadequate GCP inspection assignment Inadequate professional requirements 
Inadequate GCP training program Inadequate inspection protocols 
Inadequate clinical assessment protocols Inadequate GCP requirements 
    
Inadequate inspection protocols Inadequate GCP requirements 
    
Inadequate clinical report evaluators Inadequate report evaluation assignment 
  Inadequate training program 
Inadequate task assignment Inadequate professional requirements 
Inadequate training program Inadequate report evaluation protocols 
    
Inadequate report evaluation protocols Inadequate clinical report eval. requirements 
    
None* Permitted by regulations 
None** Inadequate clinical assessment requirements 
    
Permitted by regulations Out of scope 
Inadequate professional requirements Out of scope 
Inadequate GCP requirements Out of scope 
Inadequate clinical assessment requirements Out of scope 
Inadequate clinical report eval. requirements Out of scope 
    
    
    
    
    
    
Notes:                   
-Only the factors associated with clinical assessment 
* From trigger: Benefits outweigh risks 
** From trigger: No clinical evaluation required 
(1 of 2) 
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REMOTE RISK FACTORS FORM 
1. List immediate risk factors in the Lower Factor column (one per row); 
  2. List remote risk factors directly associated with them in the Higher Factor column (one per row); 
3. Copy the remote risk factors to the left column (one per row); 
   4. List the chained remote factors in higher levels in the right column (one per row); 
 5. Repeat steps 3 and 4 until there are no more new chained remote factors in higher levels. 
 
        Lower Factor Higher Factor 
Poor quality control Inadequate storage/manufacturing protocols 
Inadequate storage/handling conditions Inadequate storage/manufacturing protocols 
Inadequate/absent GMP inspectors Inadequate GMP inspection assignment 
  Inadequate training program 
  Inadequate manufacturing requirements 
Inadequate storage/manufacturing protocols Inadequate manufacturing requirements 
  Inadequate technical standards 
Inadequate GMP inspection assignment Inadequate professional requirements 
Inadequate training program Inadequate manufacturing requirements 
    
Inadequate technical testing system Inadequate test protocols 
Inadequate test protocols Inadequate technical standards 
  Inadequate technical testing requirements 
    
    
Inadequate technical report evaluators Inadequate report evaluation assignment 
  Inadequate training program 
Inadequate report evaluation assignment Inadequate professional requirements 
Inadequate training program Inadequate evaluation protocols 
Inadequate evaluation protocols Inadequate technical evaluation requirements 
    
None* Inadequate technical testing requirements 
    
Inadequate technical standards Out of scope 
Inadequate professional requirements Out of scope 
Inadequate manufacturing requirements Out of scope 
Inadequate technical testing requirements Out of scope 
Inadequate professional requirements Out of scope 
Inadequate technical evaluation requirements Out of scope 
    
    
Notes:              
-Only factors associated with technical assessment 
*From trigger: Technical tests not required. 
(2 of 2) 
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CLASSIFICATION FORM 
1. List map elements (condition/trigger, factor) in the Map Element column (one per row); 
2. Check "C" for Confirmed factors, "R" for Reasonable factors, and "D" for Dismissed factors; 
3. List references to back up the selected status in the Evidence column. 
Status Map Element Evidence 
C R D 
      (Clinical Assessment)   
  X   Inadequate GCP inspectors   
  X   Inadeq. clinical assessment system   
  X   Inadequate personnel or resources   
  X   Inadequate task assignment   
  X   Inadequate training program   
  X   Inadequate assessment protocols   
  X   Inadeq. professional requirements   
    X Inadeq. GCP requirements RDC10/2015: GCP must comply with international standards 
X     Benefits outweigh risks (trigger) RDC 56/2001 admits acceptable risks in relation to benefits 
X       Permitted by regulations As above.  
      (Clinical Report Evaluation)   
  X   Inadeq. clinical report evaluators   
  X   Inadequate task assignment   
  X   Inadequate training program   
  X   Inadeq. report evaluation protocols   
  X   Inadeq. professional requirements   
  X   Inadeq. clin. report eval. requirem.   
    X  Inad. clinical assessment requirem. 
 
RDC 56/2001: safety requirements compliance must be  
        backed by scientific literature or data from clinical  
 
 
 
         investigations 
     X No clinical eval. required (trigger)   As above. 
      
 
  
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
             Notes:           
Classification criteria: 
-'Confirmed' if regulation text supports map element or if other data show instances of 
the element influencing the system; 
-'Dismissed' if regulations seem to prevent the influence of the map element 
-'Reasonable' if no data have been found to confirm or dismiss the influence of the element 
 (1 of 2) 
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CLASSIFICATION FORM 
1. List map elements (condition/trigger, factor) in the Map Element column (one per row); 
2. Check "C" for Confirmed factors, "R" for Reasonable factors, and "D" for Dismissed factors; 
3. List references to back up the selected status in the Evidence column. 
Status Map Element Evidence 
C R D 
  X   (Manufacturing)   
  X   Poor quality control   
  X   Inadeq. storage/handling conditions   
  X   Inadequate GMP inspectors   
  X   Inadeq. storage/manufact. protocols   
  X   Inadequate task assignment   
  X   Inadequate training program   
  X   Inad. professional requirements   
  X   Inad. manufact. requirements   
          
      (Testing and report evaluation)   
  X   Inadeq. technical testing system   
  X   Inadequate test protocols   
  X   Inadequate technical standards   
  X   Inadeq. personnel or resources   
X     Inad. tech. testing requirements RDC 27/2011: some requirements might be dismissed 
        due to deficiencies in the national testing system 
X     Tech. tests not required (trigger) As above 
  X   Inad. technical report evaluators   
  X   Inadequate task assignment   
  X   Inadequate training program   
  X   Inadequate evaluation protocols   
  X   Inad. professional requirements   
  X   Inad. tech. evaluation requirements   
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
  
Notes: 
Classification criteria: 
-'Confirmed' if the regulation text supports map element or if other data show instances of 
the element influencing the system; 
-'Dismissed' if regulations seem to prevent the influence of the map element 
-'Reasonable' if no data have been found to confirm or dismiss the influence of the element 
 (2 of 2) 
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APPENDIX L – CASE 3 DATA 
Forms: 
-Analysis Information Form 
-Process Description Form 
-Workspace Description Form 
-Triggers Form 1 
-Triggers Form 2 
-Immediate Risk Factors Form 1 
-Immediate Risk Factors Form 2 
-Immediate Risk Factors Form 3 
-Remote Risk Factors Form 1 
-Remote Risk Factors Form 2 
-Remote Risk Factors Form 3 
-Classification Form 1 
-Classification Form 2 
-References 
 
Maps: 
-Map 1.1 
-Map 1.2 
-Map 2.1 
-Map 2.2 
-Map 3 
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ANALYSIS INFORMATION FORM 
Critical Incident (Short name for the Critical Incident): 
Inadequate infusion pump delivery 
Description (Brief description of the Critical Incident): 
Inadequate drug dose delivered to patient by infusion pump. 
  
  
Analysis Team 
        Only the PhD candidate. 
  
  
Keywords (List of keywords for topics associated with the Critical Incident)     
inadequate drug dose; patient; infusion pump 
  
  
References (Main initial references to the topics associated with the Keywords): 
  Biomedical Engineering Handbooks 
International Standards 
Academic reviews on smart pump technology 
Adverse event reports related to smart pumps 
Instructional resources online 
Fundamental Conditions (List of Fundamental Conditions for the Critical Incident): 
  (Draw logical relations here)     
(A) Reduced dose/ No delivery (A+B+C) 
  
  
(B) Increased dose 
             
A B C
Critical Incident
 
 
  
(C) Rate variation 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Scope (List of restrictions to the analysis): 
-Since the focus is on the pumps, patient's allergies, sensitivities or tolerance to drugs will be  
ignored. Also exclude drug-related problems not associated with device operation (e.g., pharmacy 
problems); 
-Focus on peristaltic infusion pumps, which are much more common than smart pumps. 
-Ignore wrong drug cases, except if caused by IV line mix-up at the bed 
Notes 
Analysis of a generic risk factors map 
Infusion pumps appeared in several of the latest ECRI's Top 10 Health Technology Hazards issues 
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PROCESS DESCRIPTION FORM 
Process Name (name of process potentially associated with the critical incident): 
Set up an infusion with an infusion pump. 
Description (general description of the process): 
Professionals gather the necessary elements for a medication infusion, prepare the infusion bag,  
the administration set, the infusion pump, and then start the infusion, making sure it started  
correctly.  
  
          Subprocess (part of 
the process) 
Elements Involved (list the elements involved in each subprocess: consider 
device, facility, patient, team, supply, and environment components): 
Gather Materials professionals, drip stand, medication bag, administration set, infusion  
  pump, facility, prescription, other drugs, patient 
  Prepare medication professionals, drip stand, medication bag, facility, prescription, other drugs,  
bag patient  
    
Prep. administration professionals, administration set, medication bag, facility 
set   
    
Prep. Infusion pump professionals, administration set, infusion pump, prescription, power  
  outlets, facility  
  Start infusion prescription, cannula, administration set, infusion pump, patient, facility 
1. Gather 
Materials
a. Medication 
bag
b. Drip Stand
c. Administration 
Set
d. Infusion Pump
2.Prepare 
Infusion Bag
a.Check 
prescription and 
bag
b. Register data
c. Label 
additional drugs
d. Unpack and 
hang solution
3.Prepare 
Administration Set
a. Unpack set
b. Clamp line
c. Spike bag
d. Fill drip 
chamber
e. Fill line with 
solution
f. Verify air 
bubbles
g.  Replace cap on 
the end of the set
4.Prepare 
Infusion Pump
a. Check if pump 
is fit for purpose
b. Program 
pump according 
to prescription
c. Attach 
administration 
set
d. Check pump 
settings again
5.Start Infusion
a. Check 
prescription
b. Check cannula 
for infection
c. Attach infusion 
to cannula
d. Record  time
e. Start pump
f. Ensure correct 
infusion and no 
adverse effects
 
 
                  (Draft process here) 
Notes 
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WORKSPACE DESCRIPTION FORM 
1. List elements involved in the subprocesses in the Element column. Place a new element after the previous 
description. 
2. Write a general description of the kind of element in the Description column. Use as many rows as neces-
sary. 
Element Description             
professionals high workload, distracted, improper training/experience, deficient  
  communication, fatigue 
    
drip stand inadequate height, inadequate pump support 
    
medication bag label legibility, multiple medication bags, inadequate infusion portal 
    
administration set no differentiation (multiple sets), inadequate dimensions, material resistance, 
  drip chamber inclination, inadequate inlet (spike), set design 
    
infusion pump poor usability, lack of safety features, inadequate accuracy, EMI 
  susceptibility, absent/discharged battery, display legibility, complex menus,  
  multiple pump models (standardization), resetting behavior, terminology,  
  mounting stability, faulty software, faulty hardware/components, 
  scarcity, alarm problems, lack of maintenance, 
    
prescription prescription legibility 
    
patient ability to comply, patient conditions 
    
facility noise, poor lighting, power fluctuations 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
Notes 
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TRIGGERS FORM 
1. List Fundamental Conditions in the Fundamental Condition column (one per row); 
2. List processes where the fundamental condition might emerge in the Process column (one per row); 
3. List potential triggers that might occur at the specific process in the Trigger column (one per row). 
Fundamental Condition Process Trigger 
Reduced Dose/No Delivery Prepare Inf. Bag Infusion bag not spiked 
    Improper bag height 
  Prepare Adm. Set Improper clamp positioning 
    Kinked tubing 
    Improper delivery of multiple drugs (single access) 
    Infusate leakage 
    Misconnection 
    Inclined drip chamber 
      
  Prepare Inf. Pump Misprogramming 
    Tubing switch 
      
  Start Infusion Occlusion of pump intake 
    Tampering (patient/family) 
    Device malfunction 
    Resetting behavior 
    EMI/supply voltage error 
    Power/battery failure 
    Drug reservoir detachment 
    Administration set variation 
      
Increased dose Prepare Adm. Set Inclined drip chamber 
  Prepare Inf. Pump Misprogramming 
    Tubing switch 
      
  Start Infusion Administration set variation 
    Tampering (patient/family) 
    Device malfunction 
    Delay in corrections/adjustments 
    Too many bolus requests 
    Resetting behavior 
    EMI/supply voltage error 
          Notes: 
          (1 of 2) 
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TRIGGERS FORM 
1. List Fundamental Conditions in the Fundamental Condition column (one per row); 
2. List processes where the fundamental condition might emerge in the Process column (one per row); 
3. List potential triggers that might occur at the specific process in the Trigger column (one per row). 
Fundamental Condition Process Trigger 
Right dose, wrong rate Prepare adm. Set Improper delivery of multiple drugs (single access) 
      
  Prepare inf. Pump Misprogramming 
      
      
  Start infusion Device malfunction 
    Delay in corrections/adjustments 
    Post-occlusion bolus 
    Resetting behavior 
    Uneven bolus delivery by the pump 
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
          Notes: 
          (2 of 2) 
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IMMEDIATE RISK FACTORS FORM 
1. List triggers in the Trigger column (one per row); 
2. List Immediate Risk Factors associated with each trigger in the Immediate Risk Factors column. 
Trigger Immediate Risk Factors 
Delay in corrections/adjustments deficient communication 
Delay in corrections/adjustments distracted 
Delay in corrections/adjustments noise 
Delay in corrections/adjustments workload 
Device malfunction EMI susceptibility 
Device malfunction faulty hardware 
Device malfunction faulty software 
Device malfunction inadequate maintenance 
Device malfunction power fluctuations 
Drug reservoir detachment ability to comply 
Drug reservoir detachment distracted 
Drug reservoir detachment inadequate infusion bag 
Drug reservoir detachment inadequate infusion set 
EMI/supply voltage error ability to comply 
EMI/supply voltage error distracted 
EMI/supply voltage error EMI susceptibility 
EMI/supply voltage error power fluctuations 
EMI/supply voltage error training 
Improper bag height drip stand height 
Improper bag height training 
Improper clamp positioning distracted 
Improper clamp positioning fatigue 
Improper clamp positioning inadequate infusion set 
Improper clamp positioning lighting 
Improper clamp positioning training 
Improper multiple drug delivery patient conditions 
Improper multiple drug delivery poor pump usability 
Improper multiple drug delivery scarcity 
Improper multiple drug delivery training 
Improper multiple drug delivery workload 
Inclined drip chamber drip stand height 
Inclined drip chamber inadequate pump support 
Inclined drip chamber training 
          Notes:          
-"inadequate infusion set" is a combination of poor set design and materials 
-"training" is a combination of experience and training in device operation and procedure protocols 
-"poor pump usability" includes hardware and software usability problems (e.g., irresponsive  
controls and complex menus) 
 (1 of 3) 
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IMMEDIATE RISK FACTORS FORM 
1. List Trigger in the Trigger column (one per row); 
2. List Immediate Risk Factors associated with each trigger in the Immediate Risk Factors column. 
Trigger Immediate Risk Factors 
Infusate leakage ability to comply 
Infusate leakage inadequate infusion bag 
Infusate leakage inadequate infusion set 
Infusate leakage training 
Infusion bag not spiked distracted 
Infusion bag not spiked fatigue 
Infusion bag not spiked inadequate infusion bag 
Infusion bag not spiked inadequate infusion set 
Infusion bag not spiked workload 
Infusion set variation ability to comply 
Infusion set variation faulty hardware 
Infusion set variation inadequate infusion set 
Infusion set variation training 
Infusion set variation workload 
Kinked tubing ability to comply 
Kinked tubing drip stand height 
Kinked tubing inadequate pump support 
Kinked tubing training 
Misconnection ability to comply 
Misconnection distracted 
Misconnection fatigue 
Misconnection inadequate infusion set 
Misconnection training 
Misconnection workload 
Misprogramming ability to comply 
Misprogramming display legibility 
Misprogramming distracted 
Misprogramming fatigue 
Misprogramming label legibility 
Misprogramming lack of safety features 
Misprogramming lighting 
Misprogramming multiple pump models 
Misprogramming poor pump usability 
Misprogramming prescription legibility 
Misprogramming terminology 
Misprogramming training 
Misprogramming workload 
Notes:                   
-"poor pump usability" includes hardware and software usability problems (e.g., irresponsive  
controls and complex menus) 
 (2 of 3) 
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IMMEDIATE RISK FACTORS FORM 
1. List Trigger in the Trigger column (one per row); 
2. List Immediate Risk Factors associated with each trigger in the Immediate Risk Factors column. 
Trigger Immediate Risk Factors 
Occlusion of pump intake inadequate infusion bag 
Occlusion of pump intake inadequate infusion set 
Occlusion of pump intake training 
Post-occlusion bolus distracted 
Post-occlusion bolus faulty hardware 
Post-occlusion bolus training 
Power/battery failure faulty/discharged battery 
Power/battery failure faulty hardware 
Power/battery failure inadequate maintenance 
Power/battery failure power fluctuations 
Resetting behavior faulty software 
Resetting behavior inadequate maintenance 
Resetting behavior training 
Tampering (patient/family) ability to comply 
Tampering (patient/family) deficient communication 
Too many bolus requests ability to comply 
Too many bolus requests deficient communication 
Too many bolus requests distracted 
Too many bolus requests training 
Tubing switch distracted 
Tubing switch fatigue 
Tubing switch inadequate infusion set 
Tubing switch lighting 
Tubing switch no set differences 
Tubing switch workload 
Uneven bolus delivered by pump EMI susceptibility 
Uneven bolus delivered by pump faulty hardware 
Uneven bolus delivered by pump faulty software 
    
    
    
    
    
    
          Notes:          
 (3 of 3) 
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REMOTE RISK FACTORS FORM 
1. List immediate risk factors in the Lower Factor column (one per row); 
  2. List remote risk factors directly associated with them in the Higher Factor column (one per row); 
3. Copy the remote risk factors to the left column (one per row); 
   4. List the chained remote factors in higher levels in the right column (one per row); 
 5. Repeat steps 3 and 4 until there are no more new chained remote factors in higher levels. 
 
          Lower Factor Higher Factor 
ability to comply inadequate patient management protocols 
faulty/discharged battery inadequate maintenance protocols 
faulty/discharged battery inadequate supervision 
deficient communication communication protocols 
display legibility inadequate technical specifications 
display legibility inadequate quality control 
distracted not further evaluated 
drip stand height inadequate design specifications 
drip stand height inadequate acquisition assessment 
EMI susceptibility inadequate technical specifications 
fatigue not further evaluated 
faulty hardware inadequate quality control 
faulty hardware inadequate technical specifications 
faulty software inadequate quality control 
faulty software inadequate software specifications 
inadequate infusion bag inadequate design specifications 
inadequate infusion bag inadequate quality control 
inadequate infusion bag inadequate acquisition assessment 
inadequate infusion set inadequate quality control 
inadequate infusion set inadequate design specifications 
inadequate infusion set inadequate acquisition assessment 
inadequate infusion set inadequate device management 
inadequate maintenance inadequate maintenance protocols 
inadequate maintenance inadequate device management 
inadequate maintenance inadequate supervision 
inadequate pump support inadequate design specifications 
inadequate pump support inadequate acquisition assessment 
inadequate pump support inadequate maintenance protocols 
    
    
    
          Notes: 
          (1 of 3) 
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REMOTE RISK FACTORS FORM 
1. List immediate risk factors in the Lower Factor column (one per row); 
  2. List remote risk factors directly associated with them in the Higher Factor column (one per row); 
3. Copy the remote risk factors to the left column (one per row); 
   4. List the chained remote factors in higher levels in the right column (one per row); 
 5. Repeat steps 3 and 4 until there are no more new chained remote factors in higher levels. 
 
          Lower Factor Higher Factor 
label legibility inadequate label templates 
lack of safety features inadequate safety specifications 
lack of safety features inadequate acquisition assessment 
lighting inadequate facility management 
multiple pump models lack of model standardization 
no set differences inadequate safety protocols 
no set differences inadequate acquisition assessment 
noise inadequate training protocols 
noise inadequate facility management 
patient conditions not further evaluated 
poor pump usability inadequate usability specifications 
poor pump usability inadequate acquisition assessment 
power fluctuations inadequate grid management 
power fluctuations inadequate power supply 
prescription legibility inadequate prescription templates 
prescription legibility inadequate device management 
scarcity inadequate device management 
terminology non standardized terminology 
terminology inadequate training protocols 
training inadequate training protocols 
training inadequate task assignment 
training inadequate training program 
workload insufficient professionals 
workload inadequate task assignment 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
          Notes: 
          (2 of 3) 
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REMOTE RISK FACTORS FORM 
1. List immediate risk factors in the Lower Factor column (one per row); 
  2. List remote risk factors directly associated with them in the Higher Factor column (one per row); 
3. Copy the remote risk factors to the left column (one per row); 
   4. List the chained remote factors in higher levels in the right column (one per row); 
 5. Repeat steps 3 and 4 until there are no more new chained remote factors in higher levels. 
 
          Lower Factor Higher Factor 
inadequate acquisition assessment bidding legislation* 
inadequate communication protocols not further evaluated 
inadequate design specifications technical requirements - devices* 
inadequate design specifications technical standards - devices* 
inadequate device management not further evaluated 
inadequate external power supply not further evaluated 
inadequate facility management not further evaluated 
inadequate grid management technical requirements - facility* 
inadequate grid management technical standards - facility* 
inadequate label templates safety requirements* 
inadequate maintenance protocols technical requirements - devices* 
inadequate maintenance protocols technical standards - devices* 
inadequate patient management protocols safety requirements* 
inadequate prescription templates prescription standards* 
inadequate quality control quality standards* 
inadequate safety protocols safety requirements* 
inadequate safety specifications technical requirements - devices* 
inadequate safety specifications technical standards - devices* 
inadequate software specifications software requirements* 
inadequate supervision not further evaluated 
inadequate task assignment job requirements* 
inadequate technical specifications technical standards - devices* 
inadequate training program job requirements* 
inadequate training protocols not further evaluated 
inadequate usability specifications usability requirements* 
insufficient professionals not further evaluated 
lack of model standardization not further evaluated 
non standardized terminology technical standards - devices* 
inadequate power supply not further evaluated 
    
    
          Notes: 
         *End-of-chain factors are not further evaluated. 
(3 of 3)  
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CLASSIFICATION FORM 
1. List map elements (condition/trigger, factor) in the Map Element column (one per row); 
2. Check "C" for Confirmed factors, "R" for Reasonable factors, and "D" for Dismissed factors; 
3. List references to back up the selected status in the Evidence column. 
Status 
Map Element Evidence 
C R D 
  X   ability to comply AAMI, 2010 
  X   faulty/discharged battery FDA, 2018 
  X   deficient communication McCabe, 2004 
  X   display legibility AAMI, 2010, p.23 
  X   distracted Beyea, 2007 
  X   drip stand height Voss & Butterfield, 2015 
  X   EMI susceptibility BS EN 60601-1-2 2007 
  X   fatigue Owens, 2007 
  X   faulty hardware FDA's Medical Device Recalls 
  X   faulty software FDA's Medical Device Recalls 
  X   inadequate infusion bag MAUDE - "Container, I.V." 
  X   inadequate infusion set Wollitz & Grissinger, 2014 
  X   inadequate maintenance Jamshidi et  al., 2014 
  X   inadequate pump support Halls, 2010 
  X   label legibility Thimbleby, 2010 
  X   lack of safety features AAMI, 2010 
  X   lighting Figueiro et al., 2006 
  X   multiple pump models AAMI, 2010 
  X   no set differences Halls, 2010 
  X   noise Morrison, 2003 
  X   patient conditions AAMI, 2010 
  X   poor pump usability AAMI, 2010 
  X   power fluctuations BS EN 60601-1-2 2007 
  X   prescription legibility Thimbleby, 2010 
  X   scarcity Nunnally & Bitan, 2006 
  X   terminology AAMI, 2010 
  X   training AAMI, 2010 
  X   workload Christian et al., 2006 
          
          
          
             Notes: 
Criteria: because it is a generic risk factors map based on the literature, all factors are considered 
reasonable. Factors would be classified as dismissed only if no reference to their influence on the 
socio-technical system could be found. 
 (1 of 2) 
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CLASSIFICATION FORM 
1. List map elements (condition/trigger, factor) in the Map Element column (one per row); 
2. Check "C" for Confirmed factors, "R" for Reasonable factors, and "D" for Dismissed factors; 
3. List references to back up the selected status in the Evidence column. 
Status 
Map Element Evidence 
C R D 
 
X 
 
inadequate acquisition assessment AAMI, 2010 
 
X 
 
inadequate communication protocols Donchin et al., 1995 
 
X 
 
inadequate design specifications Halls, 2010 
 
X 
 
inadequate device management Halls, 2010 
 
X 
 
inadequate external power supply Bendre et al., 2004 
 
X 
 
inadequate facility management Elias & Calil, 2014 
 
X 
 
inad. internal power grid management Hartungi & Jiang, 2010 
 
X 
 
inadequate label templates Thimbleby, 2010 
 
X 
 
inadequate maintenance protocols Jamshidi et al., 2014 
 
X 
 
inadeq. patient management protocols McCabe, 2004 
 
X 
 
inadequate prescription templates Thimbleby, 2010 
 
X 
 
inadequate quality control FDA's Medical Device Recalls 
 
X 
 
inadequate safety protocols AAMI, 2010 
 
X 
 
inadequate safety specifications FDA's Medical Device Recalls 
 
X 
 
inadequate software specifications FDA's Medical Device Recalls 
 
X 
 
inadequate supervision Gawande et al., 2003 
 
X 
 
inadequate task assignment Gawande et al., 2003 
 
X 
 
inadequate technical specifications FDA's Medical Device Recalls 
 
X 
 
inadequate training program AAMI, 2010 
 
X 
 
inadequate training protocols AAMI, 2010 
 
X 
 
inadequate usability specifications Halls, 2010 
 
X 
 
insufficient professionals Herout & Erstad, 2004 
 
X 
 
lack of model standardization AAMI, 2010 
 
X 
 
non standardized terminology AAMI, 2010 
 
X 
 
bidding legislation * 
 
X 
 
job requirements * 
 
X 
 
prescription standards * 
 
X 
 
quality standards * 
 
X 
 
safety requirements * 
 
X 
 
software requirements * 
 
X 
 
technical requirements - devices * 
 
X 
 
technical requirements - facility * 
 
X 
 
technical standards - devices * 
 
X 
 
technical standards - facility * 
 
X 
 
usability requirements * 
             Notes: 
Criteria: because it is a generic risk factors map based on the literature, all factors are considered reasonable. 
Factors would be classified as dismissed only if no reference to their influence on the socio-technical system 
can ould be found. 
*Remote factors at the External level are all classified as reasonable too because the analysis of legislation 
and standards is out of the scope of this study. 
(2 of 2) 
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